Elements of the Defense Attorney's Craft: An Adaptive Expectations Model of the Preliminary Hearing Decision

The way criminal defense attorneys handle cases prior to final disposition is a subject that has gone largely unexplored by researchers. This study focuses on the decisions of attorneys to waive preliminary examinations in nine felony courts. Employing both interviews and case-level data, analysis of this decision emphasizes the adaptive behavior of attorneys to local court policies, client concerns, tactical issues, and time pressures. Underlying the specific rules of choice guiding this decision are more fundamental concerns of attorneys regarding efficiency, professionalism, and the minimization of later regrets associated with waiving preliminary hearings.     

THE PARLIAMENTARY OMBUDSMAN AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

Twenty-five years after it was established in 1967 the Parliamentary Commissioner scheme is now criticized not so much on the grounds that it lacks teeth; the problem rather is that the system could be used with advantage a good deal more extensively than it is. The parliamentary Ombudsman has been under-used largely because it has generated only bounded enthusiasm among MPS, the 'gatekeepers' and potential 'magnets' for the office. Survey evidence suggests that MPS' attitudes are related mainly to their dissatisfaction with the limitations on the ombudsman's 'spatial' jurisdiction and the length of time taken by the office to investigate complaints. MPs' disapproval of these aspects of the scheme, however, may be symptomatic of a divergence between members' desire for 'quick-fix' solutions to constituents' problems and the emphasis placed on the 'audit role' of the office by successive commisioners. Greater awareness of the functions of the office by both the general public and among MPS; an extension of the Commissioner's jurisdictional remit; a faster average 'throughput' time for investigations; and possibly the introduction of a two track procedure for inquiries are all arguably required if the full potential of the Parliamentary Commissioner scheme is to be realized.     

What Drives Reforms in International Organizations? External Pressure and Bureaucratic Entrepreneurs in the UN Response to AIDS

This article explores organizational dynamics that go with the design and implementation of public administration reforms within the United Nations (UN) system. It focuses on management reforms carried out in the UNAIDS Programme, which brings together 10 UN agencies to combat the worldwide HIV/AIDS epidemic. The article suggests that understanding these reforms requires questioning the exposure of UN administrations to pressures emanating from their environment and at the same time, investigating the intentions of bureaucratic entrepreneurs who promote and drive reforms within the UN system. The empirical development demonstrates that the swift incorporation of the external pressure into a reform process in the mid‐2000s cannot be dissociated from the active support of some UN agencies who have had a common interest in shifting institutional arrangements inside UNAIDS to expand their bureaucratic authority. In conclusion, the article suggests analyzing reforms within international administrations as social processes driven by both coercion and opportunities.