What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. Attorneys

This study examines the performance of chief federal prosecutors(U.S. attorneys) and their subsequent careers. In a sample of570 attorneys in office from 1969 to 2000, the length of prisonsentences is positively related to subsequent favorable careeroutcomes for U.S. attorneys. In contrast, conviction rates donot appear to affect the careers of U.S. attorneys. These resultsare consistent with longer total prison sentences’ beingpersonally beneficial to prosecutors, and prosecutors’maximizing the length of prison sentences. Overall, the resultssuggest that sentence length, as opposed to convictions rates,is the relevant performance metric.     

RATE OF OFFENDING IN JUVENILE CAREERS: FINDINGS OF CONSTANCY AND CHANGE IN LAMBDA *

This study examines changes in the rate of offending in a sample of 8,834 males whose official juvenile law-violating careers included 26,650 offense episodes between ages 8 and 17 The rate of offending of active offenders (i.e., lambda) varied substantially as a function of age, increasing monotonically with age. Lambda, however, was not related to the age at first offense. In fact, the average lambda was amazingly constant at each individual age level regardless of the age at which offending began or desisted. Results are discussed in the light of age-crime curves known from other data sets and from the perspective of developmental changes in the rate of offending as youths grow older.     

Court Awards of Damages for Loss of Future Earnings: An Empirical Study and an Alternative Method of Calculation

This article examines the effect upon damages for personal injury of methods used in the United States of America to calculate loss of future earnings. The work of lawyers is examined from the perspective of labour economists. The damages calculated by using these alternative methods are compared with those actually awarded in over a hundred cases determined by courts in England and Wales. This interdisciplinary and comparative study reveals that the tort system fails to satisfy one of its main objectives in that it does not provide recipients of damages with 'full' compensation.     

Having the cake and eating it too: efficient penalty clauses in Common and Civil contract law

In this paper we examine one of the areas where there is a marked difference between Civil and Common contract law, that of the enforcement of liquidated damages and more particularly of penalty clauses. Common law judges are quite reluctant to enforce liquidated damages, especially if they believe that they include penalty clauses which are not enforceable. On the contrary, in almost all European contract laws liquidated damages are readily enforced, as are penalty clauses when they are not manifestly excessive. Although most law and economics scholars have criticized Common law courts for the non-enforcement of penalty clauses, there is a sizable minority of scholars who have defended the Common law “non-enforcement” policy on the ground that penalty clauses are inefficient because they hinder efficient breach. However, and despite the merits of the arguments advanced by advocates of the non-enforcement of penalty clauses, we believe that Common law’s rejection of penalty clauses is inefficient. We further show that the Civil law solution to the problem is not only comparatively more efficient, but that it can also appease the worries of those scholars who are afraid that efficient breaches will be deterred. The solution that Civil law systems give to the problem manages to enforce the parties’ wishes and to avoid deterring efficient breaches. However, we point out that in order for the Civil law systems to take advantage of this superiority, the interpretation of their Civil Codes should be guided by economic analysis and the respect to the wishes of the contracting parties.     

Distrust of Government, the Vigilante Tradition, and Support for Capital Punishment

This study probes the interconnections among distrust of government, the historical context, and public support for the death penalty in the United States with survey data for area-identified samples of white and black respondents. Multilevel statistical analyses indicate contrary effects of government distrust on support for the death penalty for blacks and whites, fostering death penalty support among whites and diminishing it among blacks. In addition, we find that the presence of a "vigilante tradition," as indicated by a history of lynching, promotes death penalty support among whites but not blacks. Finally, contrary to Zimring's argument in The Contradictions of Capital Punishment , we find no evidence that vigilantism moderates the influence of government distrust on support for the death penalty, for either whites or blacks. Our analyses highlight the continuing influence of historical context as well as contemporary conditions in the formation of public attitudes toward criminal punishment, and they underscore the importance of attending to racial differences in the analysis of punitive attitudes.