DANIELE CONVERSI,The Basques, The Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilization (Hurst, London, 1997), 312 pp., ISBN 1–85065–268–6 (pb)
LEO PANITCH and COLIN LEYS,The End of Parliamentary Socialism: From New Left to New Labour (Verso, London, 1997), 341 pp., ISBN 1–85984–109–0 (pb)
MARK MATTERN,Acting in Concert: Music, Community, and Political Action (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1998), 185 pp., ISBN 0–8135–2484–9 (pb)
RICHARD J. GOLSAN (ed), Fascism's Return: Scandal, Revision and Ideology since 1980 (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1998), 330 pp., ISBN 0–8032–7071–2
KATHERINE FIERLBECK,Globalizing Democracy. Power, Legitimacy and the Interpretation of Democratic Ideas (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1998), 216 pp., ISBN 0–7190–4995–4 (hb) 相似文献
The election of a 'New Labour' UK government in 1997 promised a new era of central-local relations facilitated by a programme of local government reform which recognised local government's 'community leadership' role. Other aspects of the agenda supported the development of multi-level governance, for example, the establishment of sub-national institutions such as the Scottish Parliament and the promotion of neighbourhoods as key sites for action. Despite these actions this paper will argue that in England the central state retains considerable influence over the key agents of local governance. Using the example of public participation policy, and drawing on the findings of a recent study in two English cities, the paper will explore how national policy aspirations were reflected locally. It concludes that while local action generally complemented national priorities, there were important points of contrast, and that localities' capacity to act in their own interests is supported by the opportunities presented in a multi-level governance environment. 相似文献
This article looks critically at how the Labour Government in the United Kingdom is using technology to connect with citizens. Although the UK Online and Citizen's Portal initiative may improve the level of service in transactions between government and citizens it is argued that such an approach misses out on the possibilities of using technology to re-invigorate democracy by creating a new public space where participatory decision making can enhance a wider project of democratic renewal. After reviewing briefly the background of government using technology, the article examines ideas of participatory democracy and endorses a normative ideal of democracy as political communication within a model of democratic process where citizens must engage with one another and with government in a genuinely neutral public space. The potential of technology to enhance democratic decision making is reviewed and a model of participatory decision making for computer support is outlined. This is followed by an overview of the range of computer support tools that are available to develop such a model. 相似文献
Abstract: Auditors general are guided by legislative mandates that specify duties and protocols but rarely the underlying purpose of auditing. When asked about their purpose, auditors typically mention the need for satisfying the accountability requirement, but the interpretation of this requirement varies: is it to root out fraud, waste and abuse; to act as a deterrent against mismanagement by assigning blame for wrongdoing; to simply measure and report the performance of government programs; or to help improve program performance? Auditors general have no executive power outside their office, but, because of their status, they can significantly influence executives. Yet, that status is based on a paradox, namely on the level of disagreement between political overseers of programs and program managers. When there is no disagreement about a program's function and performance, there is little for the auditor to do. When there is a high level of disagreement, the auditor's work becomes important because his or her opinion counts, and his or her status rises accordingly. An auditor general's office's self‐image ‐ and of the role of government ‐ informs auditors' values and their approaches to their work. The office's leadership can make these self‐images visible and influence them. The article concludes with a section on the audit offices' accountability and suggests making auditors accountable for the learning, as a result of their work, that takes place in the audited organizations. Sommaire: Les Vérificateurs généraux sont guidés dans leur travail par des mandats législatifs qui précisent obligations et protocoles, mais rarement le but sous‐jacent de la vérification. Quand on les interroge sur leur but, les vérificateurs mentionnent généralement le besoin de satisfaire l'obligation de rendre compte, mais l'interprétation de cette obligation varie. Est‐ce que cela consiste à détecter la fraude, le gaspillage et les abus? A décourager la mauvaise gestion en rejetant la responsabilité de la faute sur quelqu'un? A mesurer tout simplement la performance des programmes gouvernementaux et à en dormer un compte rendu? Ou à améliorer la performance des programmes? Les Vérificateurs généraux n'ont pas de pouvoir exécutif en dehors de leur Bureau, mais en raison de leur statut ils peuvent exercer une influence importante sur les organes exécutifs. Or, ce statut est fondé sur un paradoxe, à savoir le niveau de désaccord entre les responsables politiques des programmes et ceux qui sont chargék de leur gestion. Lorsqu'il n'y a pas de désaccord au sujet de la fonction et de la performance d'un programme, le vérificateur n'a qu'un travail limité. Lorsqu'il existe un profond désaccord, le travail du vérificateur devient important, car son opinion compte et son statut s'élève alors en conséquence. L'idée que se fait le Bureau du Vérificateur général de son rôle ‐ et de celui du gouvernement ‐ renseigne sur les valeurs et les méthodes de travail des vérificateurs. La direction du Bureau du Vérificateur général peut exposer ces perceptions et les influencer. En conclusion, le présent articlc comporte une section sur l'imputabilité des Bureaux des Vérificateurs généraux euxmêmes et laisse entendre que ces derniers devraient être imputables de l'apprentissage qui se produit dans les organismes vérifiés, suite à leur travail de vérification. 相似文献