The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship

Abstract.  Perhaps the strongest empirical finding in political science is 'Gamson's Law': the near-perfect relationship that exists in parliamentary systems between a coalition party's seat contribution to the government and its quantitative allocation of cabinet portfolios. Nevertheless, doubts remain. What would happen if the salience or importance of the various portfolios was also taken into account? Should it not be the case that payoffs correspond with bargaining power rather than seat contributions? And perhaps most significantly, would addressing these issues produce evidence that the parties designated to form governments extract disproportionately large payoffs for themselves, as predicted by 'proposer' models of bargaining? Utilizing the results of a new expert survey of portfolio salience in 14 Western European countries, the authors of this article explore each of these questions. Their basic finding is that salience-weighted portfolios payoffs overwhelmingly mirror seat contributions, contra proposer models and any other models based on bargaining power. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications for formal models of bargaining.     

Political Influences on Monetary Policy 1914–84

This study examines political, institutional and economic influences on monetary policy in the long run. A monetary policy reaction function is estimated, which focuses principally on the influence of the administration, Congress and the Federal Reserve on outcomes; these influences are estimated together with a variety of economic and political controls. The findings show that partisan control of the White House is particularly important in explaining variations in the growth of the quantity of money over time. Republican control of the White House is associated with tighter money, and Democratic control with looser money, but there are exceptions. Finally, the indirect influence of partisanship on the economic variables in the reaction function suggest that the total effects are stronger than the direct effects alone.     

Beyond dichotomous explanations: Explaining constitutional control of the executive with fuzzy-sets

Abstract. What are the main variations in the constitutional control of the executive in 45 parliamentary democracies and how can these differences be accounted for? Four competing hypotheses, based on dichotomies, explain the degree of this control by means of contrasting institutional settings: consensus democracy versus majoritarian democracy, presidentialism versus parliamentarism, thick versus thin constitutionalism and established versus new democracies. These hypotheses are tested with the help of fuzzy-sets that allow for varying degrees of membership that go beyond the presence/absence suggested by these dichotomies. The necessary and sufficient conditions for constitutional control are specified with the help of this new methodology. The fuzzy-set analysis shows that the degree of constitutional control can be explained solely by a specific combination of institutional conditions stemming from the four dichotomies, and not by one single dimension. This constellation remains hidden for the traditional correlational techniques like regression. Hence, the fuzzy-set logic presents a promising new tool for comparativists that can be used to reveal causalities.     

Making a difference: results of a pilot investigation into the impact of technical co-operation training on developing countries

This article reviews a recent innovation in the evaluation of training undertaken by the British Council on behalf of the Overseas Development Administration. It describes a pilot study carried out to assess the impact of training on personnel from a number of developing countries, six months after their return to work. The article explains briefly the context in which the exercise took place, and highlights its findings and implications for future work. First results, albeit from a limited sample, suggest positive benefits to the individual, the work group and their organization. Future analysis will in many cases be done overseas and will need to link more closely with overall project objectives to assess the impact of training. Evaluations will also need to take into account the increasing trend to supply training in-country or in a third country rather than the UK. They will also be able to check assumptions that the quality, cost and benefits to the project and host institutions are greater in these cases than for UK training.     

THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL INSPECTION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICES: THE CASE OF THE UK TRAINING MARKET

We consider two interpretations of the role of external inspection in the public services in the UK in the context of publicly funded, work‐based training programmes for young people. The first is that inspection provides substantive information to buyers concerning training quality, thereby improving efficiency in the ‘training market'. The second is that it provides procedurally oriented reassurance concerning service quality to government and the public, irrespective of substantive quality. Evidence is drawn from the inspection procedures and reports of the Adult Learning Inspectorate between 2001 and 2005. The inspectors rated training providers on various attributes, some clearly procedural, others potentially substantive. We find that while inspectors took both procedural and substantive dimensions of training into account in judging the quality of a provider's services, they attached considerably more weight to procedural than to substantive attributes. In particular, they undervalued the trainee completion rate, despite its potential association with the substantive quality of training and the priority the government attaches to raising it. These results are interpreted as evidence of limited validity in inspection findings, which do little to resolve information asymmetries in the UK training market.     

BUREAU SHUFFLING? THE REVIEW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement of 1998 resulted in the return of devolved government to Northern Ireland and, with it, a decision by the Executive and Assembly to conduct a radical review of public administration. The review is now reaching its final stages and this paper considers the likely outcomes. It both argues that the parameters of the review will limit its impact and describes the reform proposals as either structural changes or administrative rationalization, both devoid of a wider modernizing approach to improving public services. In Northern Ireland, the on/off nature of devolution could result in ‘one of the major tasks for devolved government’ (according to the Northern Ireland Executive) being implemented by Direct Rule ministers.