DO PARENTS MATTER IN CREATING SELF‐CONTROL IN THEIR CHILDREN? A GENETICALLY INFORMED TEST OF GOTTFREDSON AND HIRSCHI'S THEORY OF LOW SELF‐CONTROL*

Gottfredson and Hirschi's general theory of crime (1990) has generated an abundance of research testing the proposition that low self‐control is the main cause of crime and analogous behaviors. Less empirical work, however, has examined the factors that give rise to low self‐control. Gottfredson and Hirschi suggest that parents are the sole contributors for either fostering or thwarting low self‐control in their children, explicitly discounting the possibility that genetics may play a key role. Yet genetic research has shown that ADHD and other deficits in the frontostriatal system are highly heritable. Our research thus tests whether “parents matter” in creating low self‐control once genetic influences are taken into account. Using a sample of twin children we find that parenting measures have a weak and inconsistent effect. We address the conceptual and methodological issues associated with the failure to address genetic influences in parenting studies.     

NAZI GERMANY AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 1933–42: THE MOST IMPORTANT LABORATORY FOR DEPRESSION AMERICA?

The inter‐war period saw a flowering of comparative research on emergency administration in response to the Great Depression. This article argues that Weimar and Nazi Germany was an important point of reference for scholars comparing different policy responses to the Great Depression. Centralization and administrative discretion were considered pivotal for effective crisis governance, irrespective of the political context. The resulting administrative ideology was ignorant of the polycratic realities of the Nazi state and frequently lauded its hierarchical features while condemning the Weimar Republic as anarchic. Faced with the challenge presented by Nazism, of squaring efficiency and accountability in the context of New Deal America, scholars of public administration developed ideas for training a new type of civil servant who was capable of acting beyond the control of legislative institutions. By exploring the ambiguous relationship between public administration and Nazism, this article highlights the complex issues confronting scholars of public administration in times of crisis.     

PARENTAL EFFICACY AND DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR: DO CONTROL AND SUPPORT MATTER?

Recently, the concept of "collective efficacy" has been advanced to understand how communities exert control and provide support to reduce crime. In a similar way, we use the concept of "parental efficacy" to highlight the crime reducing effects associated with parents who support and control their youth. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), we examine the inter-relationship between parental controls and supports and their joint influence on youthful misbehavior. The results show that (1) support and control are intertwined, and (2) that parental efficacy exerts substantive effects on adolescent delinquency for the sample as a whole and across varying age groups.     

AN EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING DESISTANCE AS A PROCESS*

Recent reviews of the desistance literature have advocated studying desistance as a process, yet current empirical methods continue to measure desistance as a discrete state. In this paper, we propose a framework for empirical research that recognizes desistance as a developmental process. This approach focuses on changes in the offending rate rather than on offending itself. We describe a statistical model to implement this approach and provide an empirical example. We conclude with several suggestions for future research endeavors that arise from our conceptualization of desistance.     

The Single‐Party Dictator's Dilemma: Information in Elections without Opposition

The literature on authoritarian institutions points to nationwide elections as a mechanism for learning about the preferences of citizens. In using elections in this way, however, authoritarians face a trade‐off between gathering reliable information and guaranteeing electoral victory. In this article, we explore how single‐party regimes manage this trade‐off and the particular types of information available to them. Using candidate‐level data from Vietnam, we demonstrate that single‐party regimes, in particular, forsake information on overall regime support and strength of opposition in favor of information on the popularity of local notables and the compliance of local officials with central mandates. In addition, we show that ex ante electioneering is less risky than ex post fraud at achieving these goals.