CRIMINAL PROPENSITIES,DISCRETE GROUPS OF OFFENDERS,AND PERSISTENCE IN CRIME*

Criminal propensity theorists argue that the causes of variation in offending behavior can be traced to variation in one or more causal traits. Other theorists contend that there is actually more than one type of offender and that more than one causal mechanism operates to explain offending behavior. In this article, some of the implications of these two positions are considered. Then, their congruence with recidivism data from a cohort of post-age-16 North Carolina institutional releasees (N = 848) is assessed, The analysis focuses specifically on whether the correlates of offending persistence are similar across two categories of individuals: those who experienced their first adjudication at an early age and those who were first adjudicated at a later age. In support of both positions, some similarities and some differences in the correlates of persistence were discovered. The differences, however, were only evident when the threshold for late first adjudication was set to age 12. When this threshold was raised to higher ages, the differences disappeared.     

An Enforcement Taxonomy of Regulatory Agencies

A variety of multivariate techniques were used to develop a taxonomy of regulatory agencies from the first comprehensive study of the disparate enforcement strategies employed by business regulatory agencies in one country. Seven types of agencies were identified: Conciliators, Benign Big Guns, Diagnostic Inspectorates, Detached Token Enforcers, Detached Modest Enforcers, Token Enforcers and Modest Enforcers. Agencies were distinguished primarily according to their orientation to enforcement versus persuasion, according to their commitment to detached (or arms length) command and control regulation versus cooperative fostering of self-regulation, and according to their attachment to universalistic rulebook regulation versus particularistic regulation. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to view regulatory agencies as lying on a single continuum from particularistic non-enforcers who engage in cooperative fostering of self-regulation to rulebook enforcers whose policy is detached command and control. This approximates the suggestions of Hawkins and Reiss for distinguishing regulatory agencies according to a "sanctioning/deterrence" versus "compliance" dimension. The predominant regulatory style in Australia, however, is distant from both poles, being a perfunctory regulatory approach which is neither distinctively diagnostic and educative nor litigiously "going by the book"; rather it amounts to "going through the motions". The typology also partially conforms to Black's categorisation of social control as penal, therapeutic, conciliatory and compensatory.     

CENTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE DYNAMICS OF TRIADIC RELATIONSHIPS

The accession of the UK into the European Community in 1973 and the growth in power and competence of European institutions in subsequent years prompts a rethink of relationships between central and local governance. Rather than a dyadic process between two sets of bodies, the new triadic system is based on varying interactions between the three groups of actors at each level. The article develops six possible scenarios of new relationships which can be simplified into centralization, no change or decentralization. To appraise the nature of the changes, the article examines the operation of the European Regional Development Fund, the additionality controversy, lobbying over the 1994 reform of the structural funds and aspects of environmental regulation. Rather than one scenario dominating, the findings show several types of new relationships emerging.     

Proposals for Improving GPRA Annual Performance Plans

The Government Performance and Results Act process is now well embedded in the departments and agencies, and it is now timely to consider ways to improve the value of agency plans and reports, both to the Congress and to agency managers. This article offers several recommendations about how Annual Performance Plans can be made more valuable.