Still Causing Trouble: The Conservative Parliamentary Party

There have been relatively few backbench rebellions on the Conservative benches in the Commons since 2001, but division manifested itself on three significant occasions: over the Children and Adoption Bill (when the leadership insisted on applying a whip to a vote that many thought should have been 'free'), over Lords reform (where on a free vote a majority of Conservative MPs voted against their leadership's preferred position) and over Iraq (where the divisions were smaller than on the Labour side of the House but where there was a qualitative dimension to the rebellion). Most importantly of all, the events of October 2003, when Iain Duncan Smith was removed as party leader, showed how much power remained with Conservative MPs: they initiated the vote of confidence, in which they alone participated, and the emergence of Michael Howard as the 'unity' candidate meant that the grassroots were denied any role in the change of leadership.     

The visibility of agricultural subsidies and market illusions in the Common Agricultural Policy: Some evidence from farmers' views in Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom

Abstract.   This article demonstrates that the design and nature of agricultural support schemes has an influence on farmers' perception of their level of dependence on agricultural support. While direct aid payments inform farmers about the extent to which they are subsidised, indirect support mechanisms veil the level of subsidisation, and therefore they are not fully aware of the extent to which they are supported. To test this hypothesis, we applied data from a survey of 4,500 farmers in three countries: the United Kingdom, Germany and Portugal. It is demonstrated that indirect support, such as that provided through artificially high consumer prices, gives an illusion of free and competitive markets among farmers. This 'visibility' hypothesis is evaluated against an alternative hypothesis that assumes farmers have complete, or at least a fairly comprehensive level of, information on agricultural support schemes. Our findings show that this alternative hypothesis can be ruled out.     

The Political Constraints on Economic Policy in Post-1982 Mexico: The Case of Pemex

Abstract Fourteen years of market-oriented reform in Mexico have led to many economic changes. However during 1982–1994 there was relatively little change in the hydrocarbon sector. This article seeks to explain the slowness of reform essentially in political terms. While political constraints on reforming the hydrocarbons sector were genuine, it is also clear that the De la Madrid and Salinas governments chose to avoid controversial decisions in this sector as far as possible. Risk aversion seems, at least in this context, to have been a characteristic of Mexican authoritarianism during 1982–1994. Because of the inherent importance of the oil and gas sector to the Mexican economy, the slow growth of production since 1982 (largely resulting from extreme policy caution) provides a part of the explanation for the slow growth of the Mexican economy as a whole.     

The Parliamentary Party

The Conservative parliamentary party will fulfill three important functions for any incoming Conservative government: it will be the focus of attention for the national media; it will be the bulk vote that will deliver its legislative programme; it will form the talent pool from which members of any incoming government will be recruited. A majority Conservative government could see a majority of its MPs newly elected, with more Conservative women and ethnic minority MPs than ever before (although there will be little change in the socio-economic background of their MPs). These new MPs will present problems in terms of party management, although they will be less likely to rebel than longer-serving MPs. There are also relatively few signs of discontent among incumbent Conservative MPs (the article identifies the most rebellious Conservative MPs). Any new Conservative government will also have to deal with a reformed House of Lords, in which it will no longer have a majority.     

Business Management Reform in the Department of Defense in Anticipation of Declining Budgets

Business management reform efforts have been part of the U.S. Defense Department agenda for decades. Current reform efforts have explicitly established the goal of generating, harvesting, and reinvesting savings from business management reform to buy more capital items; that is, they have focused on a measurable reallocation from operating and support costs to investment within a given budget top line. Recent increases in the defense top line, largely related to the war on terrorism, are not likely to persist; in addition, an examination of the factors affecting the top line suggests that a decline in the near term is likely. An examination of current and past defense management reforms suggests that efficiency‐seeking business management reforms are not likely to generate sufficient resources to cover a budget decline. Instead, management reform should be sustained for reasons of stewardship and accountability.