Subjective Invulnerability,Optimism Bias and Adjustment in Emerging Adulthood

The relationship between subjective invulnerability and optimism bias in risk appraisal, and their comparative association with indices of risk activity, substance use and college adjustment problems was assessed in a sample of 350 (M _age = 20.17; 73% female; 93% White/European American) emerging adults. Subjective invulnerability was measured with the newly devised adolescent invulnerability scale (AIS). Optimism bias in decision-making was assessed with a standard comparative-conditional risk appraisal task. Results showed that the danger- and psychological invulnerability subscales of the AIS demonstrated strong internal consistency and evidence of predictive validity. Subjective invulnerability and optimism bias were also shown to be empirically distinct constructs with differential ability to predict risk and adjustment. Danger invulnerability and psychological invulnerability were more pervasively associated with risk behavior than was optimism bias; and psychological invulnerability counter-indicated depression, self-esteem and interpersonal problems. Results support recent claims regarding the “two faces” of adolescent invulnerability. Implications for future research are drawn.     

Credit Constraints and Distress Sales in Rural India: Evidence from Kalahandi District,Orissa

The literature on the rural credit market in India (and elsewhere) has generally assumed that peasant farm households are rationed in their access to subsidized formal credit. Because of a lack of infrastructure and poor access to institutional credit, such farmers are exploited by means of an interlocked market connecting informal credit to the sale of paddy. The resulting gap, between the sale by a borrower of paddy at a predetermined low price, and the price of this commodity on the open market, constitutes the amount of what is termed a distress sale. The latter is itself influenced by the bargaining capacity (or lack thereof) of the peasant farmer who borrows on the informal market. Also of importance in determining whether or not a cultivator is compelled to resort to the informal credit market – and thus into an interlocked arrangement – is the need for additional liquidity to meet production costs and/or household consumption, as well as the monopsony nature of the paddy market. Data from Kalahandi district in Orissa suggest that access to formal credit is limited in rural areas although there exists a high demand for it, that a high degree of credit rationing by the formal lender occurs, and that poor implementation by the state of minimum support price policy all contribute to the need for informal loans and its attendant interlinkage.