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911.
A previously identified difficulty with the development of latent fingerprints on low-density polyethylene (LDPE) by vacuum metal deposition (VMD) is that excess gold deposition prevents effective zinc deposition and so inhibits latent print development [1]. The investigation of a means to correct for excess gold deposition was the basis for this study. Exposure to zinc and the readmission of air into the vacuum chamber followed by VMD development results in the deactivation of the initial gold clusters due to the formation of zinc oxide and the adsorption of air and water molecules. As a result, the majority of the gold deposited during the second treatment creates new gold clusters rather than adding to the gold clusters previously formed. After excess gold deposition on LDPE, the deposition of 1.5 times the optimum gold amount will result in good-quality normal development. The results also indicate that, on all surfaces, at least twice the initial gold count should be used for re-treatment when further development is required after air has been readmitted to the chamber. 相似文献
912.
Veto player models generally rely on two assumptions: (1) collective actors like political parties behave as individual actors; and (2) all actors influencing policy production are domestic. Yet these are often violated by empirical reality. Under certain institutions, parties are less cohesive and may not behave as individuals, and international regimes can have considerable influence over legislation. Using data on labor‐law production in Europe, we find that the effects of veto players are conditional on both party cohesion and international regimes. Future conceptualizations of veto players should be more sensitive to both internal and external institutional configurations. 相似文献
913.
We develop a general theory of budgetary politics and examine its implications on a new data set on U.S. government expenditures from 1791 to 2010. We draw on three major approaches to budgeting: decision‐making theories, primarily incrementalism and serial processing; policy process models; and path dependency. We show that the incrementalist budget model is recursive and that its solution is exponential growth, and isolate three periods in which it operates in pure form. The equilibrium periods are separated by critical junctures, associated with wars or economic collapse. We assess policy process dynamics by examining the deviations within equilibrium periods. We offer three takeaways: (1) exponential incrementalism is fundamental to a theory of budgeting; (2) disjoint shifts in the level of exponential incrementalism are caused only by critical moments; (3) temporally localized dynamics cause bends in the exponential path, longer returns to the path within budgetary eras, and annual punctuations in budget changes. 相似文献
914.
915.
Yilin Hou Robin S. Lunsford Katy C. Sides Kelsey A. Jones 《Public administration review》2011,71(3):370-388
The authors examine the track record of applying performance‐based budgeting (PBB) across three time periods within a sample of U.S. state governments: (1) throughout the 1990s, (2) in the early 2000s, and (3) during the Great Recession. State‐level PBB is analyzed according to four elements: (1) the development of performance measures, (2) its applicability to budgeting and management processes, (3) its utility across the business cycle, and (4) its usefulness for budget players. An analytical framework is devised that highlights the “publicness” of American government, draws on the principal–agent model, and considers incentive mechanisms theory. Findings confirm that a good performance measurement system takes time to develop and operate well and that PBB functions more effectively for executive management than legislative purposes. PBB is used more by the states during strong economic times as opposed to during economic downturns. More importantly, PBB is only selectively applied by legislators in most states, whereas top executive policy makers, middle managers, and staff embrace and utilize PBB systems more extensively. 相似文献
916.