The use of information technology in civil litigation in England and Wales is in its infancy. In particular, litigation support systems are used by few,1 and only within some solicitors’ offices and barristers’ chambers. The process of litigation support has not yet been taken from the solicitor's office into the court room.
Complex litigation is an area of legal practice particularly apt to benefit from the use of modern information technology both before trial and during the trial. Complex litigation involves such a diversity of issues, allegations of fact, and divergent opinions as to be difficult to retain within the short term memory of one human brain for the length of time taken by the exposition of the evidence and argument followed by judicial analysis and expression of the judgment.
This type of litigation also benefits from intervention by the Court in the preparations for trial, and in that endeavour information technology would also be most helpful.
In this article I shall try to review in very general terms what is done and what could be attempted. I shall generally concentrate on civil rather than criminal litigation.
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