Partisanship and the party system

The defining properties of party identification long established for the United States fail with some frequency to be replicated in electoral systems abroad. A number of plausible suggestions have been made to account for this system-level variability: Most of these have some face merit, but none taken alone is adequate to provide a full cross-system explanation. Variation in party system size or fractionalization has recently been discussed as another source of differential dynamics of party loyalties. Unfortunately, the conventional means of assessing party identification properties are subject to rather severe artifacts, typically ignored, when comparisons are made across systems of very different party size. The conceptual stakes underlying key methods options for such comparisons—most notably, between continuous and discrete statistical tools—are examined. The use of continuous statistics for systems of very multiple parties rests on an assumption that voters do in some degree regard these party systems as imbedded in a continuous space. A simple test for this assumption is mounted in four systems and unsurprisingly it shows very clear support. Analysis of residuals beyond this obvious result add several points of less obvious information about the distribution of party affect in such systems.     

The optimal size of government

In the economic analysis of the theory of government, two views of government are evident. The Pigovian view sees government as a benevolent actor striving to correct for the inadequacies and excesses of an unrestrained marketplace. The ‘Public Choice’ view of government portrays government as the tool of special interest groups as likely to generate distortions as to correct them. In this paper, a model of government that incorporates both views will be developed and then empirically tested. The model developed assumes that all expenditures by the government are inputs into the private sector production. Treating government expenditures as inputs into the production of private sector output, there is some optimal size of government that maximizes private sector output. The model incorporates a general production function for private sector output. Output is a function of private labor, private capital, and government expenditures. The Pigovian and Public Choice views of government are reflected in the assumed impact of G on the marginal productivities of L and K. The model is tested using United States data and a Cobb-Douglas production function. Estimates indicate that the 1983 level of government expenditures exceeds by 87 percent the level that would maximize private sector output. Reducing government from $ 491 billion to $ 263 billion and shifting the freed labor to the private sector would increase output from $ 1187 billion to $ 1451 billion.     

The 1984 election as Anthony downs and Stanley Kelley might interpret it

This paper is an analysis of two rational choice theories of elections. Anthony Downs and Stanley Kelley's theories yield complementary interpretations of the 1984 U. S. election. Reagan's victory was based on both prospective and retrospective judgments as well as on candidate and policy considerations. Reagan won that element of an incumbent's reelection that is a referendum on his performance as president. However, people also voted on the basis of domestic and foreign policy preferences for the second term. On these issues voters preferred Mondale as much as Reagan. Reagan's victory owed remarkably little to his conservative agenda and to a warm regard for his personal qualities as a leader. His landslide was deceptive. The two Reagan victories were among the weakest of the six landslides of the postwar period by Kelley's test of decisiveness. The Reagan elections have not set the United States on the course of a long-term conservative agenda in either domestic or foreign affairs.     

Voting for ‘Sin’ in Kansas

We would like to thank our colleagues Nancy Snyder and William Terrell for comments and suggestions. The assistance of Ron Farha and Michael Webb is gratefully acknowledged, as is the patience of the staff in the Elections Office of the Office of the Secretary of State, Topeka, Kansas. Any errors or omissions are, of course, the responsibility of the authors.     

Treaty Federalism in Northern Canada: Aboriginal-Government Land Claims Boards

Treaty federalism in North America encompasses not only governanceimplications of the historic treaties signed with Aboriginalpeoples, but also the modern-day treaties known as "comprehensiveland claim agreements." This article explores how treaty federalismis realized in Northern Canada through claims-mandated jointgovernment-Aboriginal boards dealing with wildlife management,land-use planning, and environmental protection. These boards,existing at the intersection of the three orders of government-national,federal/territorial, and Aboriginal—are found to be uniquegovernance institutions, with substantial independence fromgovernment. They have significantly enhanced Aboriginal peoples'influence over land, wildlife, and resource decisions, but theextent to which they bring Aboriginal culture and worldviewsto bear in decision-making remains an open question.