REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCILS IN SOUTH AFRICA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

This article traces the evolution of local government structures in South Africa, known as Regional Service Councils (RSCs), which were created in 1985. The first section traces the history of local government in the country and how apartheid led to separate structures for different racial groups. This is followed by an account of why the National Party (NP) created RSCs, which were neo-apartheid structures, incorporating certain features of metropolitan government. The major features of Rscs are discussed and analysed. The operation of the Rscs around the country is assessed. The final section of the article looks at moves towards non-racial local government structures in the light of broader political developments in the country. The future of RSCs as well as metropolitan government generally is discussed.     

UNDERCOVER DECEPTION CLUES: A CASE OF RESTRICTIVE DETERRENCE*

Although studies on drug dealing have examined techniques sellers use to ensure against undercover infiltrations, none has explored the use of such techniques at the interactional level. The objective here is to address this void by exploring the perceptual shorthand dealers use to determine whether buyers in question are undercover. This perceptual shorthand processes one of two types of deception clues in making this judgment: trend discontinuity and interpersonal illegitimacy. Trend discontinuity is associated with police in formants and results from situations in which (I) familiar customers suddenly introduce unfamiliar others who wish to buy drugs and (2) familiar customers suddenly and signifcantly increase quantities they themselves desire to purchase. Interpersonal illegitimacy is associated with undercover agents and results from situations in which unfamiliar buyers emit certain physical and verbal “vibes” believed to be indicative of covert law en forcement personnel. Discussion focuses on the data's presuppositional and microstructural implications for restrictive deterrence (Gibbs, 1975). Data were drawn from semi-structured interviews with 32 semi-institutionalized heroin user-dealers located in a very large western US. city.     

Regulatory Risk Management of Psychoactive Substances

Congress and the Drug Enforcement Administration have assigned certain psychoactive substances to one of five schedules, based on assumed or demonstrated abuse potential. Although formidable difficulties exist in assessing the hazards of drug use, some of these assignments do not appear consistent with empirical estimates. This mismatch of assignment and abuse potential -possibly due to "radical" political ideology - obscures significant differences in drug effects, and therefore stifles meaningful public participation in evaluating the benefits, risks, and proper use (if any) of available psychoactive substances.     

Dog Whistles and Democratic Mandates

Manipulative mixed messages from candidates to voters affect what governments are entitled to do in office. A party that wins an election gains a 'mandate to rule'. But there is a second type of mandate: a 'policy mandate' to enact specific policy proposals central to the winning party's campaign. Mixed-message politics in general can undermine policy mandates, and the use of 'dog whistle politics' - telling one group of voters one thing, while allowing or encouraging another group to believe another - makes the inferring of policy mandates especially problematic. Referendums provide only a partial remedy to dog whistle politics. Winning a clear policy mandate means forgoing dog whistle politics, despite the short term electoral advantage they may deliver.     

Case Processing Times in Three Courts

The time it takes a court to process its cases, a critical aspect of court performance, varies widely from case to case, from court to court, and within a given court as the court and its environment change over time. The sources of this variation, however, have remained largely obscure.
This paper examines the structural and case-level influences on processing times in three criminal courts experiencing structural changes, including a number of administrative reforms designed to reduce processing times. We find both similarities and differences between courts, but in general both many structural arrangements and many case characteristics affect processing times, with some case characteristics having different effects under different structural arrangements, and some structural arrangements affecting different sorts of cases differently. We conclude with a discussion of implications for court management.