A guide for the analysis of policy arguments

Based on what appears to be required for fully supporting a proposal for policy action, a series of interrelated propositional types is suggested as a tool for the design and critique of policy arguments. The kinds of criticisms to which different prepositional types are susceptible and the impacts of these on a policy argument are explored as are the uses persons in different roles might make of these criticisms. Finally, as an example, the typology is applied to a portion of the President's 1973 State of the Union Address.A draft of this paper was prepared while the author was Research Fellow in the Educational Policy Research Center at Syracuse. Suggestions on earlier drafts by Paul P. Van Riper, Warren A. Dixon, and Gerald C. Swanson at Texas A&M University are acknowledged with appreciation.     

Incorporating skill development into the MPA curriculum

This article recommends that MPA Programs not already doing so consider two ideas. First, explicitly include skill development as an important program objective. Second, use the strategy of incorporating skill development and reinforcement into existing courses rather than adding new courses. A process for identifying skills and deciding where to locate them in the curriculum is presented. A list often generic skills is suggested along with a discussion of how they might fit within an MPA core curriculum.     

Politics of prisoner of war recovery: SOE and the Burma–Thailand Railway during world war II

This article considers why SOE were given a prominent role in POW recovery in the Far East during the last months of the war and immediately after VJ Day. This was a task normally allotted to the International Committee of the Red Cross. It examines both strategic and humanitarian motivations as possible explanations of this policy. It reviews the means used to execute this policy along the Burma–Thailand Railway, including close cooperation with the Thai resistance movement. The success of SOE's operations are assessed and the impact of their testimony in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials is also reviewed against the background of a growing appreciation of the role of secret service in providing evidence to international tribunals.     

Conclusion: exploring the heart of civic darkness

This article is a synthesis of Volume II of Public Policy and Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective and an extension of the arguments found herein. And, it is an application of issues of ethics and morality to this volume. The author calls for a return to civility in public discourse and to Plato's conception of virtue, and particularly public virtue. New versions of civic space are important. The American emphasis on individualism must be tempered by a greater concern for the common good and the public interest. To achieve this public administrators must be both examples and representative citizens.

Cyrano: Perhaps I do exaggerate—a little.

Le Bret: You see!

Cyrano: But for the sake of principle.

Also in practice I have often found Exaggeration works extremely well.

—Edmund Rostand

Cyrano de Bergerac

And sin, when it is full grown, brings forth death.

—James 1:15

“Civic darkness” and “sin” are offputting words. “Offputting” is also an offputting word, but we must do what we can to follow Cyrano's advice to the Count de Guiche and color our discourse as but we can. Actually, sin is quite a useful word, meaning, as it does, transgression of a moral principle. Those whose sensibilities are offended when words such as sin are introduced, or react in anger at remembrances of the excesses of evangelical piety, would do well to revisit the idea of separation from the moral good and the consequences such separatilon has for persons and for societies. Such is the case with what I will call the sin of incivility, which I believe leads us into a civic heart of darkness, which is the deathtrap of American democracy. I will exaggerate—a little.

The word “moral” is also an attenuated word. It tends to conjure personal identity material and prejudgments about the authority, associations, and intent of the preacher or philosopher using the term. Fresh in my memory after twelve years is the aftermath of the publication of my article, “The Problem of Moral Reasoning in American Public Administration: The Case for a Code of Ethics,” in the Public Administration Review of January/February 1983. Of the nineteen letters I received about the article, five came from academic public administrationists wondering why a person of my background should now be joining the Moral Majority. I sent each of them a copy of my work exposing Jerry Falwell's problems with the Federal Trade Commission.

We have before us thirteen papers and twelve responses, each dealing with an important aspect of public policy. Are there common threads running through them? Do they highlight recurring themes in American public administration? Since they were written just before the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1989, was there anything prescient about them, or are they just historical artifacts, interesting enough in themselves but now overtaken by events?

There is a common thread, and that is a continuing commitment to the legacy of Mimowbrook I, understood as a post-positivist concern with social values. The most prophetic and, I believe, relevant statements of Minnowbrook I1 extended that understanding to the societal, organizational, and personal dimensions of communicative ethics, including the problem of the alienation of the self. I will elaborate that interest in my discussion of incivility below.

The old controversies were also there: in Willa Bruce's demand that Cynthia McSwain and Orion White translate their exercise in analytic psychology “into a practical application to real world problems,” for example, and in Gary Wamsley's passionate belief that public administrationists should “unmask the norms economists camouflage as science.” Complementarities were there, too, as when real world public administrator, Ray Pethtel, Virginia Commissioner of Transportation, said hurrah for egghead John J. DeIulio, describing him as “a scholar who recognizes the value of the public manager!” A pernicious theme that continued at Minnowbrook II, despite the efforts of conference organizers to diminish it through representation and structured dialogue, was that those who live more contemplative lives do not live in the real world. The truth is that most academic public administrationists are or have been heavily involved in workaday policy formulation and execution and that most civil servants reflect profoundly on what they do. Why, then, do we continue to use the language of separation?

Although there were arguments at Minnowbrook II, and I well remember the tension in the room after Bruce and Wamsley spoke, as on other occasions, we stayed well within the bounds of civility. That is what democracy does. It roughs and tumbles and postures and threatens and in the end stays within the bounds of civility. It finds a way we can live together. Minnowbrook II did not anticipate the degree to which incivility, manifested as displaced anger, separatist politics, and cultural isolation, would come to characterize public discourse in America in the 1990s and threaten the continued existence of democracy itself. Such a development demands careful analysis.

Plato would not have been surprised at any of this, as Dorothy Robyn pointed out in her paper about using cases for teaching public management. Since cases focus on how a process affected substantive policy questions, it is easy to ignore the inherent merits of the policy. Thus induction from fact replaces deduction from theory and leaves a large potential for casuistry and the justification of moral laxity. When discussion of a case begins with the postulate that at least one of the protagonists was unethical, the opportunities for recognizing moral ambiguity in the situation itself are limited. The temptation to reduce moral reasoning to laws and regulations tends to replace the abstraction of the public manager as a political being deducing his or her strategies from whatever ideal is being served. Deontological ethics become the analytical norm.⁽¹⁾

Plato's impatience with deontological ethics means that he is not a popular theorist among democrats today. Yet his critique of democracy remains the most powerful in philosophic literature, and I believe his analysis is particularly relevant for an American political environment of electronic sound bites and bored ignorance about the processes of government. There is a paradoxical way in which Plato's explication can deliver those of us who care too much.

The rhetoricians have their way in a democracy, Plato says. As they pursue their enthusiasms, trying to persuade the inattentive public here and there, misleading the people when necessary, they devise temporary solutions to fundamental problems. They consume as they encourage others to consume, leaving nothing in store. They live transient lives in mortal bodies. The worst thing about rhetoricians such as Gorgias, Plato believes, is that they misuse words. They often invert their meaning. Words are the vehicle of the dialectic that can lead us to transcendent truth, but in the hands of Gorgias, they produce only chaos and discord. In Plato's terms, the rhetoricians

once they have emptied and purged [the good] from the soul of the man whom they are seizing … they proceed to return insolence, anarchy, wastefulness, and shamelessness from exile, in a blaze of light, crowned and accompanied by a numerous chorus, extolling and flattering them by calling insolence good education; anarchy, freedom; wastefulness, magnificence; and shamelessness, courage.⁽²⁾

The deliverance inherent in Plato is the sure knowledge that virtue does not lie finally in what one can achieve in the political world, including the public good served in feeding the poor and bringing social justice to the disinherited. We work to achieve the good, yes; indeed, we may pour out our lives in service to democratic ideals. But virtue is a personal condition of the mind and spirit. In a calculous of inherent worth, prostitutes may be more virtuous than virgins. Virtue may be present in me while I endure any physical or temporal condition, including slavery, the dissolution of the Roman Empire, the trivialization of the Christian Church, or the collapse of the American Republic. Authentic freedom, and whatever wisdom has been given to me, exists in my being and only there. I can enslave myself, of course, and that includes slavery to any appetite, including the passion to be or do good.

Such reasoning is a useful antilogistic ingredient in dealing with the cascading series of manifestos in American public life telling us that we cannot live together; we cannot work together; we are not in this together; we are not Americans who have something in common, but racial, ethnic, gender, or sexually identified groups who demand to be recognized only or exclusively as different. I require that you recognize that we have nothing in common with one another. If goodness or greatness of soul is a capacity that each man and woman has, as Plato argued, then it is also true that each of us has a similar capacity for evil. The theologians of the Middle Ages called that capacity sin and defined it as separation from God, moral principle, and each other.     

Power and morality: a misleading dichotomy

This article critically addresses E H Carr's dichotomy of power and morality by demonstrating that all analytical languages used to articulate world affairs systematically refer to both power and morality, albeit in a different manner. The distinction between the two concepts is an analytical one, rather than a dichotomy of the kind that Carr constructs. Although Carr's dichotomy has recently resurfaced as a distinction between ‘communitarianism’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’, such an interpretation of his work remains problematic. This is demonstrated through a case study of President Jimmy Carter—whose policies manifest both realist and liberal approaches and combine power-centred concerns with moralistic ones. Therefore, in practical world affairs, there is no power-morality dichotomy; there are only different accounts of what both power and morality entail.     

In Defence of the West: General Lauris Norstad,NATO Nuclear Forces and Transatlantic Relations 1956–1963

In the history of NATO, lack of Atlantic communality is a recurring theme. Atlantic cohesion was constantly challenged. However, the discord among NATO members rarely threatened the very existence of the Alliance. The late 1950s and early 1960s witnessed such a rare occurrence. In Europe the question of nuclear sharing triggered the development of blue-prints for a step-by-step replacement of the Atlantic security co-operation by a European Security Community. These blueprints were discussed among the EEC member-states and within the forum of the WEU. This study analyses not only those concepts, but also the role of the SACEUR, General Norstad, in defending NATO from external threats and internal decay. By studying the leeway of the SACEUR, this study tries to establish whether the subsystem of the international system, formed by the nations of the North Atlantic area after the Second World War, should be characterised as a system of hegemonic stability or as a pluralistic security community. The article is based on recently declassified archival material from both sides of the Atlantic.     

Recent Education Policy and School Reform in Bavaria: A Critical Overview

This paper gives a critical overview of school reform measures in the German state of Bavaria in the aftermath of the OECD's PISA 2000 and 2003 studies. While the highly selective Bavarian school system has provided the best test results among the German federal states, its overall performance in an international context has been less impressive. In order to improve the Bavarian education system a range of initiatives has been introduced in recent years. While following pedagogically sound ideas in most cases, however, the projects have been hampered by fiscal restraints, ideological reservations against breaking up the traditional three-tier system of secondary education, prevailing bureaucratic restrictions, and a lack of improvements in incentives for teachers' involvement in reform. As a consequence, genuine, fundamental changes in the traditional system have not so far been initiated.     

“I have never met the normal woman”: Stella Browne and the politics of womanhood

Abstract

F. W. Stella Browne (1880–1995) and her views on female sexuality have been much discussed of recent years. These discussions have tended to rely on a limited number of her copious (if often hard-to-find) writings, and have also failed to take into account where Stella, as an individual woman, was coming from. In the light of ongoing researches into her life and career, this article locates her writings in her life of activism in a wide variety of causes. It argues that her opinions about women's needs do not conform to a simplistic model of a ‘New’ feminism of difference, and that her relationship to the thought of contemporary male sexologists has been presented in a one-dimensional and misleading way. Her tripartite commitment to feminism, socialism, and individualism is illustrated, drawing on a wide range of her writings and statements between 1912 and 1937. In her crusade to celebrate and liberate the “variety and variability of women” Stella sought constantly to overthrow concepts of a monolithic female nature as well as to reject the Double Moral Standard: ‘normality’ to her was an instrument for the oppression of women. Consideration is also given to the wider influence of her ideas.