Psychological Assessment of Chief of Police Candidates: Scientific and Practice Issues

This report examines issues associated with the selection of a Chief of Police. A review of the literature indicates minimal progress in specifying appropriate objective selection procedures for the Police Chief. This is attributable to a research focus on broad leadership styles, rather than specific competencies, and an inattention to the unique needs of individual jurisdictions. As a potential alternative, a hiring process model is offered that includes a systematic job analysis within the given jurisdiction, and the use of a reliable and well-validated instrument to assess job candidates’ leadership potential and skills. This approach is illustrated by a case study of a medium-size city that followed the recommended procedures to make a hiring decision that has been sustained across more than a year’s time, and which appears to be working out. The uses of testing results to help the Chief of Police to enhance personal capabilities within the new position also are discussed.     

Observations of reintegrative shaming in a mental health court

This study compares the use of stigmatizing and reintegrative shame - as specified in Braithwaite's Crime, shame and reintegration (1989) - across traditional criminal court and mental health court settings. Items from the Global Observational Ratings Instrument were used to gather data on 87 traditional court cases and 91 mental health court cases, presided over by five different judges. The observational items capture three constructs: respect, disapproval, and forgiveness, as they apply to Braithwaite's theory. We present means tests to examine differences in shaming between court types and judges. Findings show that the mental health court is more likely to use reintegrative shaming and show respect and forgiveness for offenders, and less likely to show disapproval. Similarly, judges who preside in both court types are significantly more likely to practice reintegrative shaming in the mental health court context. We further explore these findings using field notes and illustrate those components of a mental health court that are conducive to reintegrative shaming.     

State Performance‐Based Budgeting in Boom and Bust Years: An Analytical Framework and Survey of the States

The authors examine the track record of applying performance‐based budgeting (PBB) across three time periods within a sample of U.S. state governments: (1) throughout the 1990s, (2) in the early 2000s, and (3) during the Great Recession. State‐level PBB is analyzed according to four elements: (1) the development of performance measures, (2) its applicability to budgeting and management processes, (3) its utility across the business cycle, and (4) its usefulness for budget players. An analytical framework is devised that highlights the “publicness” of American government, draws on the principal–agent model, and considers incentive mechanisms theory. Findings confirm that a good performance measurement system takes time to develop and operate well and that PBB functions more effectively for executive management than legislative purposes. PBB is used more by the states during strong economic times as opposed to during economic downturns. More importantly, PBB is only selectively applied by legislators in most states, whereas top executive policy makers, middle managers, and staff embrace and utilize PBB systems more extensively.     

Long-term recidivism of mental health court defendants

The first MHC was established in 1997 and now, over 15 years later, there are over 300 mental health courts in the United States. In a relatively short time these courts have become an established criminal justice intervention for persons with a mental illness. However, few studies have looked at the long-term outcomes of MHCs on criminal recidivism. Of the studies evaluating the impact of MHCs on criminal recidivism, most follow defendants after entry into the court during their participation, and only a few have followed defendants after court exit for periods of one or two years. This study follows MHC defendants for a minimum of five years to examine recidivism post-exit with particular attention to MHC completion's effect. Findings show that 53.9% of all MHC defendants were rearrested in the follow-up and averaged 15 months to rearrest. Defendants who completed MHC were significantly less likely to be rearrested (39.6% vs. 74.8%), and went longer before recidivating (17.15 months vs. 12.27 months) than those who did not complete. This study suggests that MHCs can reduce criminal recidivism among offenders with mental illness and that this effect is sustained for several years after defendants are no longer under the court's supervision.     

Veto Players Revisited: Internal and External Factors Influencing Policy Production

Veto player models generally rely on two assumptions: (1) collective actors like political parties behave as individual actors; and (2) all actors influencing policy production are domestic. Yet these are often violated by empirical reality. Under certain institutions, parties are less cohesive and may not behave as individuals, and international regimes can have considerable influence over legislation. Using data on labor‐law production in Europe, we find that the effects of veto players are conditional on both party cohesion and international regimes. Future conceptualizations of veto players should be more sensitive to both internal and external institutional configurations.     

Incentivizing Responses to Self-report Questions in Perceptual Deterrence Studies: An Investigation of the Validity of Deterrence Theory Using Bayesian Truth Serum

Objective

Criminological researchers want people to reveal considerable private information when utilizing self-report surveys, such as involvement in crime, subjective attitudes and expectations, and probability judgments. Some of this private information is easily accessible for subjects and all that is required is for individuals to be honest, while other information requires mental effort and cognitive reflection. Though researchers generally provide little or no incentive to be honest and thoughtful, it is generally assumed that subjects do provide honest and accurate information. We assess the accuracy of deterrence measures by employing a scoring rule known as the Bayesian truth serum (BTS)—that incentivizes honesty and thoughtfulness among respondents.

Method

Individuals are asked to report on self-report offending and estimates of risk after being assigned to one of two conditions: (1) a group where there is a financial incentive just for participation, and (2) a BTS financial incentive group where individuals are incentivized to be honest and thoughtful.

Results

We find evidence that there are some important differences in the responses to self-reporting offending items and estimates of the probability of getting arrested between the groups. Individuals in the BTS condition report a greater willingness to offend and lower estimates of perceived risk for drinking and driving and cheating on exams. Moreover, we find that the negative correlation between perceived risk and willingness to offend that is often observed in scenario-based deterrence research does not emerge in conditions where respondents are incentivized to be accurate and thoughtful in their survey responses.

Conclusion

The results raise some questions about the accuracy of survey responses in perceptual deterrence studies, and challenge the statistical relationship between perceived risk and offending behavior. We suggest further exploration within criminology of both BTS and other scoring rules and greater scrutiny of the validity of criminological data.     

An Integrated Theory of Budgetary Politics and Some Empirical Tests: The U.S. National Budget, 1791–2010

We develop a general theory of budgetary politics and examine its implications on a new data set on U.S. government expenditures from 1791 to 2010. We draw on three major approaches to budgeting: decision‐making theories, primarily incrementalism and serial processing; policy process models; and path dependency. We show that the incrementalist budget model is recursive and that its solution is exponential growth, and isolate three periods in which it operates in pure form. The equilibrium periods are separated by critical junctures, associated with wars or economic collapse. We assess policy process dynamics by examining the deviations within equilibrium periods. We offer three takeaways: (1) exponential incrementalism is fundamental to a theory of budgeting; (2) disjoint shifts in the level of exponential incrementalism are caused only by critical moments; (3) temporally localized dynamics cause bends in the exponential path, longer returns to the path within budgetary eras, and annual punctuations in budget changes.