Interest in political campaigns: The influence of question order and electoral context

A split-ballot experiment shows that, when people are asked how interested they are in following political campaigns, their response depends not only on the order in which the question is asked, but also on the broader electoral context in which it is posed. When asked how interested they were in following the political campaigns immediatelyafter a question about whether or not they voted in the (1982) election, people were more likely to think they were interested in the campaign, especially if they claimed to have voted, than if they were asked about it immediatelybefore the question on whether or not they voted. This order effect, however, appears to depend onwhen the questions are asked. If asked within a few weeks after the election, there is little or no order effect. But later, as the memory of the campaign fades, the order of the questions makes a sizable difference in the results. This order effect also seems to be more pronounced among better-educated respondents, suggesting that they are more likely to feel pressured by a social norm to vote and to express an interest in political affairs, not only in real life, but in the survey interview as well. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications for the design of the interview schedule used in the American National Election Studies.The research reported in this paper was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES81-11404).     

The R and D contract and democratic theory

The purposes of this essay are to describe how federal research and development policy has altered authority relationships and to suggest a new concept of legitimacy in accord with the changed conditions. Research and development (R and D) creates an indeterminate future. Thus, the politics of research and development incorporates an apparent contradiction : political leadership demands that jobs be done which require creative and unpredictable actions on the part of private organizations, while it also demands that contractors be held responsible for fulfilling goals efficiently, avoiding deleterious secondary consequences, and refraining from abuses of power. The paradox can be resolved by creating norms of responsibility that allow for judgments on how a job is done rather than what is to be done. New institutions for technological assessment to check on unintended consequences of projects and citizen review boards to estimate the quality of life engendered by projects may provide such norms of responsibility.