RICO: The genesis of an idea

In 1970, the Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act. Title IX of the 1970 Act is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act or RICO. This Act had its origins in legislation going back as far as 1934, but coming forward to 1961. The 1970 Act borrowed ideas from this earlier legislation, principally “enterprise,” but also the use predicate statutes to define “racketeering activity.” The ideas are not new, but their combination affects how prosecutors and law enforcement agents investigate, try, and sanction violations of the Act. RICO’s drafting also reflects organizational theory and economic analysis. The investigation and prosecution of a single crime committed by an individual on a single day and in a single place maybe done using one set of procedural and evidentiary rules. Nevertheless, the investigation and prosecution of patterns of diverse offenses committed by, through, and against licit and illicit enterprises require sophisticated procedures, evidentiary rules, and criminal sanctions. In addition, antisocial conduct is more than a challenge to the administration of criminal justice; it also requires the full panoply of civil sanctions, including public injunctions as well private enforcement of injunctive relief and treble damages. RICO has had a profound effect on the prosecution of organized crime, white-collar crime, and other forms of similar criminal behavior. William J. & Dorothy K. O’Neill Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; A.B. 1957, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1960, Notre Dame Law School. Professor Blakey was the Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 1969-70 when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-542, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) was processed, Title IX of which is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act or RICO. For a general treatment of the statute from a variety of perceptive, see the collection of law review literature in G. Robert Blakey & Kevin Roddy, “Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning an Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding, Abetting and Conspiracy Liability under RICO,” 33 Amer. Crim. L. Rev. 1345, 1348 n. 3(1996).     

Fear of victimization and health

Fear of victimization may have consequences for subjective well-being. I develop and test a model linking fear of victimization to subjective health. I hypothesize that two processes link fear to subjective health-psychological and behavioral. Specifically, I hypothesize that fear of victimization increases psychological distress, and fear decreases outdoor physical activity, especially walking. High levels of psychological distress and low levels of walking, in turn, are associated with poor self-reported health. I find empirical support for the hypothesized processes in a representative national sample of 2031 adults aged 18 to 90 interviewed by telephone in 1990. The negative association between fear and health is explained largely by psychological distress and walking. However, a significant direct effect remains. I conclude with suggestions for future research linking crime and health, focusing on the need for collecting information on community disorganization. Community context is likely the ultimate exogenous variable-the one that sets in motion the destructive cycle of fear, distress, inactivity, and poor health described here.     

When ADR becomes the law: A review of federal practice

Conclusion With the passage of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, the stage was set for innovation and change in federal agencies. Now, part way into the five-year life of the Act, a new administration has the potential to encourage even wider use of ADR at the federal level, providing still more examples from which to develop a clearer sense of best practice. Additional funds, both for ACUS and individual agencies, are vital to providing the level of experimentation, innovation, and documentation needed to ensure success.MIT ProfessorLawrence E. Susskind is director of the MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program, 512 Pound Hall, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.Eileen F. Babbitt is associate director of the Public Disputes Program.Phyllis N. Segal is a practicing mediator with Endispute, Incorporated.The authors would like to acknowledge the federal dispute resolution specialists who contributed greatly to our work by providing interviews and materials for this article: Cathy Costantino of FDIC; David Batson of EPA; John Settle and Ron Walczak of HHS; David Drabkin of DLA; Jim Jones of DOL; Sheldon Guttman of FCC; Charles Pou of ACUS; Jeff Domber of GSA; and Diane Liff of DOT.     

Changes in Legislative Support for the Governor's Program Over Time

Abstract This study examines changes in legislative support for the governor's legislative agenda in Georgia during the governor's first term in office (1991–94). I analyze the factors that led legislators to support the governor's agenda, as well as how the level of support changed between election years and off‐years. I use multivariate OLS models of gubernatorial support to determine how support varied (1) between the parties, (2) between factions within parties, and (3) over time. I find that there was wide variation in support among factions in the majority party and that support varied widely between election years and off‐years.