Information,apprehension, and deterrence: Exploring the limits of police productivity

The capacity of police departments to solve crimes and apprehend offenders is low for many types of crime, particularly crimes of profit. This article reviews a variety of studies of police apprehension and hypothesizes that an important determinant of the ability of the police to apprehend criminals is information. The complete absence of information for many types of crime places fairly clear upper bounds on the ability of the police to effect solutions.To discover whether these boundaries are high or low we analyzed data from the 1973 National Crime Panel about the types and amount of information potentially available to police through victim reports and patrol activities. The evidence suggests that if the police rely on information made readily available to them, they will never do much better than they are doing now. On the other hand, there appears to be more information available to bystanders and passing patrols than currently is being used, which suggests that surveillance strategies and improved police methods for eliciting, recording, and analyzing information supplied by victims and witnesses might increase the probability of solving crimes and making arrests. In light of this we review a few possibly helpful innovations suggested in the literature on police productivity and procedure.     

Some limitations of the groves-ledyard optimal mechanism

Public Choice - The tax rule suggested by Groves and Ledyard is certainly an ingenious one, although there is no indication as to how one might fall upon that specific scheme. If offers Pareto...     

POLITICIANS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC POLICIES

Policy scientists can make important contributions to the study of policy distribution, a question that is likely to be among the most crucial national issues to be discussed throughout this decade. One aspect of this question that has been neglected is the theoretical assumption associated with public choice theory that politicians, once elected, will reward their supporters through the distribution of policy benefits. However, empirical research indicates that policy benefits seldom are distributed in this way. Instead, politicians follow the principle of universalism. In league with bureaucracies and policy communities, politicians define need and then ask bureaucracies to allocate benefits. This makes politicians roles as distributors of policy very different than simplistic models suggest.     

CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAMS IN FOOD COOPERATIVES

Food cooperatives have played a vanguard role in consumer protection through (a) information and education, (b) selective merchandising and boycotts, and (c) political lobbying. While education and selective merchandising benefit primarily their own membership, the political efforts have benefited all consumers.