Law Guanxi: MNCs,state actors,and legal reform in China

Since 1978, China has opened itself to foreign direct investment and has undertaken significant legal reform, especially in the area of international commercial arbitration. I analyze the roles that foreign actors and state officials have played in changing Chinese legal institutions such as the Chinese International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and personal relations, or guanxi. 1 ^1. La guanxi is a Chinese expression, meaning ‘to pull strings (to get things done)’. View all notes Foreign investors, attorneys, and non-governmental organizations are helping China to adopt formal commercial arbitral institutions that follow international norms. In that sense, foreign actors are contributing to rule of law in China. Yet, foreign investors also attempt to use guanxi to get around central regulations, thereby contributing to informal legal institutions. The combination of guanxi and formal legal institutions follows a model of path dependent institutional change. I use the terms, ‘layering’ and ‘bricolage’ to elucidate the ways that actors combine existing institutions with new legal forms introduced by foreign investors, attorneys, and NGOs.     

THE ROLE OF NEIGHBORHOOD CONTEXT IN YOUTH CO‐OFFENDING

Despite co‐offending being a core criminological fact, locating suitable peers has many challenges. Chief among these, given the risky nature of co‐offending, is finding trustworthy accomplices. We propose that neighborhoods serve as youths’ most ready source of accomplices, and as such, their composition affects the likelihood of identifying suitable co‐offenders. In particular, youth are more likely to co‐offend in contexts with more peers of their race/ethnicity, less disadvantage, and greater residential stability—all of which promote trust among neighbors. We test our hypotheses using multilevel models applied to census data and official court records for 7,484 delinquent youth in a large metropolitan area. The results offer support for our hypotheses and provide greater insight into how individual and contextual factors combine to affect co‐offending behavior. An implication of these findings is that many of the same neighborhood characteristics that reduce crime lead to a greater proportion of co‐offending.     

THE VICTIMIZATION–TERMINATION LINK*

The life histories of drug dealers suggest that victimizations sometimes mark turning points toward the end of criminal careers, which is a criminologically important but neglected empirical connection that we label the “victimization–termination link.” We theorize this link thusly: When serious victimizations occur in the context of crime, a break from the customary provides an opportune situation for adaptation, and when victims have social bonds and agency, when they define the event as the result of their own criminal involvement, and when they find other adaptations unattractive, criminal‐victims are likely to adapt by terminating crime. We illustrate this desistance process with qualitative data obtained through interviews with young, middle‐class drug dealers. We conclude by exploring promising avenues for future work. It takes only a minute to change one's whole life course.     

Public Safety Outcomes of Virginia's Detention Assessment Instrument

The placement of juveniles in secure detention has been the subject of considerable attention recently. For the past several years, Virginia has been engaged in efforts to improve detention practices at both the state and local levels. One important policy and practice change is the implementation of a standardized, structured decision‐making instrument to guide detention decisions by intake officers of the Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). This report will present a brief background on the Detention Assessment Instrument (DAI); an analysis of the performance of the DAI on key public safety outcomes; and an overview of Virginia's participation in the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI).     

Slavery,Partisanship, and Procedure in the U.S. House: The Gag Rule, 1836–1845

From the 24th through the 28th Congresses, the House of Representatives operated under versions of a “gag rule” that blocked petitions dealing with abolition and related matters. This article presents the gag rule as not only a historically important window into slavery deliberations in Congress but also a case study in majority party restrictions of minority rights—and in the boundaries that constituency politics can place on majority power. Through analysis of vote choices and voting changes over time, I demonstrate that the gag rule's partisan origins gave way as northern members voted against party and with specific constituency pressures as well as general sectional sentiment. The gag rule shows the power of electoral considerations and constituency in the early U.S. House, and it also illustrates the force that constituency can have over majority procedural maneuvering.     

Said and Unsaid: State Legislative Signaling to State Courts over Same Sex Marriage 1990–2004

From 1990 through 2004, same sex marriage emerged as a major policy issue. In responding to this controversial policy issue, many state legislatures demonstrated unusual behavior. A substantial minority of state legislatures continued to introduce new legislative bills on this topic long after the legal position of the respective state would indicate that the state had articulated a recognized and settled policy. In this article, we propose that the apparently aberrant behavior of these state legislatures can be explained in part by consideration of legislative signaling directed toward state courts. Specifically, we consider the attempt of state legislators to discourage intervention by the state courts around some policy issues.     

Long‐Term Change and Stability in House Voting Decisions: The Case of the Minimum Wage

Although members of Congress exhibit considerable stability in their voting decisions on similar, recurring issues, members' long‐term voting histories reveal evidence of systematic instability as well. I argue that members reverse positions in predictable ways when the vote history loses value as a decision cue, and I present empirical evidence for this behavior in the context of the highly salient and regularly repeated House decisions on increasing the federal minimum wage. The empirical findings suggest that reversals of member positions are related to institutional, electoral, and constituency factors. I conclude by discussing the importance of these findings to understanding congressional decision making and representation.