POWER-CONTROL THEORY,GENDER, AND DELINQUENCY: A PARTIAL REPLICATION WITH ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF PEERS*

This examination of Hagan et al.'s (1985, 1987) power-control theory of delinquency and gender finds that gender and delinquency are related to the relative authority of parents at work in ways unexpected by power-control theory. Support is found, however, for the power-control thesis pertaining to parental control and risk-taking attitudes. In reconciling differences between these findings and those of Hagan et al., the conclusion is that relations of affiliation as well as parental authority are important determinants of delinquency and its relationship with gender.     

A Contagious Concept: Explaining the Spread of Privatization in the Telecommunications Sector

Qualitative studies suggest that the spread of privatization of public utilities is due to a change of the economic paradigm and institutional isomorphism pressures. However, current quantitative studies mostly account for domestic factors. These factors can explain differences in national privatization trajectories but cannot explain the large trend. Based on a quantitative analysis of privatizations in the telecommunications sector in 21 OECD countries, the article argues that emulation pressures can explain the trend toward privatization. The analysis suggests that privatization gained legitimacy as more and more governments emulated privatization policies they observed in countries they perceived as similar. However, the article finds no evidence of cross‐sectoral diffusion. Thus, according to the analysis, telecommunications privatization diffused within the same sector between countries, but not within the same country between different sectors.     

How deliberation makes better citizens: The Danish Deliberative Poll on the euro

Abstract.  This article presents results from a Danish national Deliberative Poll on the single European currency. A representative sample of 364 Danish citizens assembled to deliberate on Denmark's participation in the single currency. As a quasi-experiment, the Deliberative Poll is an example of deliberative democracy. Four research questions regarding these deliberative processes are analyzed: openness and access, the quality of deliberation, efficiency and effectiveness, and publicity and accountability. The participants' responses reflect a deliberative process characterized by considerable changes in political opinions as the Poll proceeds, increase in level of knowledge and an improved ability to form reasoned opinions. A mutual understanding on the subject matter prevailed among the participants. At the same time, self-interest and domination also appeared during the deliberative process. The article emphasizes the need for further elaboration of the theory of deliberative democracy so that it better reflects these features of 'real-life' politics.     

After Enlargement: Voting Patterns in the Sixth European Parliament

We examined how voting behavior in the European Parliament changed after the European Union added ten new member‐states in 2004. Using roll‐call votes, we compared voting behavior in the first half of the Sixth European Parliament (July 2004‐December 2006) with voting behavior in the previous Parliament (1999–2004). We looked at party cohesion, coalition formation, and the spatial map of voting by members of the European Parliament. We found stable levels of party cohesion and interparty coalitions that formed mainly around the left‐right dimension. Ideological distance between parties was the strongest predictor of coalition preferences. Overall, the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 did not change the way politics works inside the European Parliament. We also looked at the specific case of the controversial Services Directive and found that ideology remained the main predictor of voting behavior, although nationality also played a role.     

To Simulate or NOMINATE?

Carroll et al. (2009) summarize the similarities and differences between the NOMINATE and IDEAL methods of fitting spatial voting models to binary roll‐call data. As those authors note, for the class of problems with which either NOMINATE and the Bayesian quadratic‐normal model can be used, the ideal point estimates almost always coincide, and when they do not, the discrepancy is due to the somewhat arbitrary identification and computational constraints imposed by each method. There are, however, many problems for which the Bayesian quadratic‐normal model can be easily generalized, so as to address a broad array of questions and take advantage of additional data. Given the nature and source of the differences between NOMINATE and the Bayesian approach—as well as the fact that both approaches are approximations of the decision‐making processes being modeled—we believe that it is preferable to choose the more flexible Bayesian approach.