大鼠液压冲击脑损伤TGF-β1及其受体TβR I的表达

目的观察脑损伤后TGF-β1及其受体TβRI蛋白表达及其时序性变化,探讨脑损伤的分子机制及法医学脑损伤时间推断。方法用免疫组织化学方法观察大鼠液压冲击脑损伤后TGF-β1及其受体TβRI蛋白在伤后不同时间(30 min、1 h、3 h、6 h、12 h、1 d、3 d、7 d)的表达情况,以正常大鼠及手术大鼠作为对照。结果 (1)正常及手术对照组大鼠脑组织内有低水平的TGF-β1及TβRI表达;(2)脑损伤后1～3d,大脑皮质和脑干TGF-β1/TβRI蛋白表达逐渐增加,7 d时仍维持在高表达水平;(3)海马冲击后12 h～1 d逐渐增加,3 d时仍处于高表达水平,7 d时已开始下降。结论脑损伤可诱导TGF-β1/TβRI基因在脑内表达,其时序性改变可望用于法医学脑损伤时间推断。     

Doctors in Extremity

Book Reviews in This Article:
Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide.
Eric Stovcr and Elena O. Nightingak, eds., The Breaking of Bodies and Minds: Torture, Psychiatric Abuse and the Health Professions.
Elliot S. Valenstein, Great and Desperate Cures: The Rise and Decline of Psychosurgery and Other Related Treatments for Mental Illness.     

Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy?

The "modernization" reforms of European antitrust are summarized and interpreted. The article uses principal–agent analysis enhanced by socio-institutional insights. The reforms in policy implementation are of historic importance. While they appear to promise decentralization to national competition authorities, more sophisticated analysis points to an increase in the centralized power of the Commission. The novel instrument of a supranational European Competition Network creates a redesigned relationship between the Commission and the member states that carries high risks of incoherence. Modernization driven by a legal epistemic community carries a less obvious risk that increased power of competition policy will unduly reinforce liberal market disciplines through a juridification of the European competition regime.     

Changes in Legislative Support for the Governor's Program Over Time

Abstract This study examines changes in legislative support for the governor's legislative agenda in Georgia during the governor's first term in office (1991–94). I analyze the factors that led legislators to support the governor's agenda, as well as how the level of support changed between election years and off‐years. I use multivariate OLS models of gubernatorial support to determine how support varied (1) between the parties, (2) between factions within parties, and (3) over time. I find that there was wide variation in support among factions in the majority party and that support varied widely between election years and off‐years.