Franchise Extension and the British Aristocracy

Using evidence from the Second Reform Act, introduced in the United Kingdom in 1867, we analyze the impact of extending the vote to the unskilled urban population on the composition of the Cabinet and the background characteristics of Members of Parliament. Exploiting the sharp change in the electorate caused by franchise extension, we separate the effect of reform from that of underlying constituency‐level traits correlated with the voting population. Our results are broadly supportive of a claim first made by Laski (1928): there is no causal effect of the reform on the political role played by the British aristocracy.     

Democracy,the Market,and the Logic of Social Choice

This article compares the types of knowledge democracy and the market require to rationally allocate resources. I argue that high levels of public ignorance and voters’ inability to compare the effects of different parties’ policies make it difficult for parties and elections to rationally allocate resources. Markets mitigate these problems because the simultaneous existence of multiple firms’ products facilitates comparisons that mimic the conditions of scientific experimentation. The economy of knowledge involved in such comparisons indicates there are epistemic advantages to using firms and markets, instead of political parties and elections, to allocate scarce resources. However, in contrast to arguments that markets merely provide better information than political decisions, I argue markets’ epistemic advantages are derived from the way they facilitate comparisons that minimize decision makers’ need for knowledge or understanding.     

Parties and institutions: empirical evidence on veto players and the growth of government

Does the effective number of veto players in a political system explain the rate of government growth? Panel data analyses are conducted in order to test several measures of veto players against each other, and these results are compared with similar analyses of government fractionalization. The analyses indicate that veto players and especially government fractionalization exert a constraining effect on changes in the size of government, but also that the effect is not consistent over time: neither veto players in general nor fractionalization of government in particular exerted any constraining effect during the decades of rapid government growth due to welfare state creation and expansion in the 1960s and 1970s. The strength of government fractionalization vis-a-vis the veto player measures in explaining changes in the size of government suggest that the constellation of partisan veto players within coalition governments matters, while the effect of institutional veto players remains uncertain.     

Making Citizen Participation Work: The Challenging Search for New Forms of Local Democracy in The Netherlands

Governance theory shows that governments no longer operate as actors that take unilateral decisions but instead have to share power and influence with various other actors. There is also a large body of literature that shows a growing discontent with (local) democracy. These two trends lead various local governments to either reaffirm representative democracy, or to introduce elements of direct participatory democracy. In practice the combination of the two – representative and direct participatory democracy – can be problematic. This paper describes the experiences of Hoogeveen, a medium-sized municipality in the Netherlands with a far-reaching programme of direct participatory democracy. In Hoogeveen, local residents can decide on yearly budgets for their neighbourhood and become involved in the long-term planning of its development. The Hoogeveen case shows that direct participatory and representative democracy can be balanced with the help of (1) connecting arrangements, (2) professional connectors and (3) steady political support.     

Juror decision making,attitudes, and the hindsight bias

This study examines juror decision making in civil suits against police officers alleged to have engaged in illegal searches, using simulated case materials and mock jurors drawn both from adults called for jury service and a student subject pool. The experiment assesses the impact of a cognitive process (thehindsight bias) and of individual attitudes on awards and finds that both are related to juror decisions. We test a theoretical model that specifies that both attitudes and outcome knowledge exercise their influence upon the damage award decision by means of their impact on interpretation of testimony. Causal models of the decision-making process appear to support the role played by interpretation of evidence as a mediator between individual attributes and juror decisions.We are indebted to Reid Hastie, Tom Tyler, Phoebe Ellsworth, Jack Heinz, Robert Nelson, Rayman Solomon, and Bonnie Fisher for assistance with various aspects of the design, data collection, and analysis reported here. Financial support was provided by the American Bar Foundation, and the Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research and the Dispute Resolution Research Center, both at Northwestern University.John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.     

Time Horizons and Multilateral Enforcement in International Cooperation

This article examines the effects on international cooperation of the rivalness and excludability of international goods. Rivalness affects bargaining power when the negotiating states have different discount rates; with rival goods states with higher discount rates will be empowered, while with nonrival goods states with lower discount rates will be empowered. Excludability affects the enforceability of agreements once reached; multilateral agreements about nonexcludable goods cannot be enforced through retaliation-in-kind. As such, agreements concerning international toll goods are likely to reflect the interests of the state(s) with the lower discount rate(s), and be multilaterally enforceable. Agreements concerning international public goods should similarly reflect the interests of those with the lower discount rates, but be more weakly enforced. Finally, agreements concerning international common pool resources should both reflect the interests of those with higher discount rates, and be weakly enforced. The article concludes with some strategies to mitigate the negative effects on cooperation discussed.