The Institutional Interplay Regarding the New Architecture for the EC's External Assistance

Abstract:  The article concerns the inter-institutional relations and describes the dynamics between the main EC institutions in the decision-making process regarding the adoption of the new external action instruments. In 2004, the Commission had proposed a set of new external action instruments as base for the delivery of the Community's external assistance. By that time, the existing instruments amounted to more than 30 different legal instruments, which implicated a loss of efficiency in the management of the EC's external assistance. After 2 years of inter-institutional negotiations between the European Parliament, Council and the Commission, the new set of instruments was finally adopted. Compared to the initial Commission proposals, the design of the new instruments got significantly reshaped in the course of the inter-institutional decision-making procedure. In particular, the European Parliament had gained an unprecedented degree of power over the legislative framework for external spending.
Compared to the former range of geographic and thematic regulations, the new external action instruments fundamentally reform the delivery of external financial assistance with their streamlined and simplified structure. They consist of three horizontal instruments to respond to particular needs or crisis situation: an Instrument for Stability, an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation) and a European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. With regard to geographic coverage, four instruments will implement particular policies: the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument and the Instrument for Development Co-operation and an Instrument for Co-operation with Industrialised Countries.     

‘TO BE,BUT NOT TO BE SEEN’: EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS

International civil servants (ICS) are largely excluded from the analysis of International Organizations (IOs) because states are assumed to be the determining force in shaping their behaviour. Even principal‐agent and constructivist analyses often treat an IO’s staff as a unit and are concerned primarily with states’ capacities to control IOs. Examining the opportunities of ICS, rather than the choices of states, provides a better means of understanding the capacities of ICS to contribute to the operation of IOs, and especially when they participate in multilateral negotiations. We suggest that structure, competence, legitimacy and culture provide a framework for analysing ICS variable capacity. We use the Secretariat of the WTO, known as a ‘member‐driven organization’, to illustrate how ICS can play a critical role in achieving the IO’s objectives. A word on our title. It comes from Esse, non videri in the original, as quoted by a director at the WTO in an interview in April 2003.     

STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977

The implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) of 1977 in coal producing states is guided by a partial preemption policy approach t h a t establishes a balance between federal and state decision-making authority. The usefulness of this approach is assessed by analyzing state enforcement actions in relation the institutional capacity of states to shoulder regulatory responsibilities and the propensity of the federal Office of Surface Mining (OSM) t o oversee state enforcement actions and, if necessary, to undertake corrective action. Our results indicated that state administration of SMCRA was canstrained by the lack of effective federal oversight but was largely unaffected by interstate differences in political, economic, or administrative characteristics.     

Inequality,Ethnicity, Political Mobilisation and Political Violence in Latin America: The Cases of Bolivia,Guatemala and Peru*

The paper explores the relationship between political violence and ‘horizontal’ inequality in ethnically‐divided countries in Latin America. The cases studied are Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru. Preliminary results are reported on the measurement of horizontal inequality, or that between groups, defined in cultural, ethnic and/or religious terms. The Latin American cases are shown to be often more unequal than the cases from Africa and Asia included in the wider study of which the work forms a part. The complex relationship between such inequality, ethnicity and political violence is explored historically. Ethnicity is today rarely a mobilising factor in violence in the Latin American cases, but the degree of inequality based on ethnicity is shown to be highly relevant to the degree of violence which results once conflict is instigated. History explains why.