Negotiating North–South dynamics and the Philippine experience in the WTO

This paper elucidates how domestic and external factors have shaped the negotiating policy of the Philippines in bringing about incremental gains not only for its benefit but also for other developing countries during the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture Doha Development Round (DDR). The internal factors include the following: (1) executive monopoly of the WTO negotiations; (2) issue-based fragmentation and dispersal of authority; (3) the autonomy and flexibility of the Philippine WTO negotiator; (4) the involvement of civil society in the WTO negotiations, and (4) the central role of the Department of Agriculture as the lead agency in the WTO negotiations. A major reason for this is attributed to an external factor which is the centrality of agriculture as a major WTO issue among developing countries. Other external factors, on the other hand, include the following: (1) the strong solidarity among developing countries and (2) the confinement to particular issues with regards to coalition-building. These factors helped to strengthen the bargaining leverage of the Philippines, a seemingly ‘weak’ country, vis-à-vis the developed countries in the WTO.     

The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace

What are the dynamics of coercion in cyberspace? Can states use cyber means as independent tools of coercion to influence the behavior of adversaries? This article critically assesses traditional coercion theory in light of cyberspace's emergence as a domain in which states use force, or its threat, to achieve political objectives. First, we review the core tenets of coercion theory and identify the requisites of successful coercion: clearly communicated threats; a cost–benefit calculus; credibility; and reassurance. We subsequently explore the extent to which each of these is feasible for or applicable to the cyber domain, highlighting how the dynamics of coercion in cyberspace mimic versus diverge from traditional domains of warfare. We demonstrate that cyber power alone has limited effectiveness as a tool of coercion, although it has significant utility when coupled with other elements of national power. Second, this article assesses the viability and effectiveness of six prominent warfighting strategies in the traditional coercion literature as applied to the cyber domain: attrition, denial, decapitation, intimidation, punishment, and risk. We conclude that, based on the current technological state of the field, states are only likely to achieve desired objectives employing attrition, denial, or decapitation strategies. Our analysis also has unique implications for the conduct of warfare in cyberspace. Perhaps counterintuitively, the obstacles to coercion that our analysis identifies may prompt states to reevaluate norms against targeting civilian infrastructure.     

Technical discourse in defense of public virtue: Ronald Reagan's explanation of the Iran/contra affair

Contemporary political communication is marked by an evolving dialectical tension between public and technical forms of discourse. Using Ronald Reagan's explanation of the Iran/Contra arms‐for‐hostages initiative as a case study, this article explores the rhetorical uses of technical rationality and the dangers these appeals pose for public deliberation. A close reading of Reagan's March 4, 1987, Iran/Contra defense speech demonstrates that Reagan employed the Tower Commission Report's technical judgments to separate the ethical realm of the public from the nonethical realm of the technical. As a result, he was able to define the Iran/Contra affair as an instrumental problem of bureaucratic organization rather than a betrayal of the public trust. This strategy of demarcating the moral realms of agent from agency is conceptualized as both a moral dodge and an instance of what Kenneth Burke calls ironic discourse. The article concludes by contrasting Reagan's strategy with other recent political crises in which public servants did not separate their public virtue from their administrative responsibility.     

The World Bank as Knowledge Bank: Analyzing the Limits of a Legitimate Global Knowledge Actor

The World Bank has always sold ideas, not just loans. Starting in 1996, then president James Wolfensohn rebranded the Bank by articulating a formal vision of a “Knowledge Bank”—a provider of state‐of‐the‐art expertise on development. After a number of internal changes and assessments, the Bank is acknowledging that it needs to be more humble, pluralistic, and practical. Why do some regard the Bank as a legitimate knowledge actor, whereas others contest that authority? We offer an analytical framework that can explain stakeholders' uneven recognition of the Bank's knowledge role. When stakeholders define knowledge as products, the Bank generally obtains recognition for the quality and quantity of the information it generates. This is the output dimension of legitimacy. On the other hand, when knowledge only counts as such to users who have been part of the process of creating it, the Bank finds itself with limited recognition.     

Internal colonization, folk justice, and murder in Appalachia: The case of Kentucky

For three decades, the southern subculture of violence thesis was the center of debate for homicide researchers. Often, the South was regarded as a homogeneous region regarded as a subculture without attending to within-region variations. This research tested whether there were subregional variations within the state of Kentucky, paying particular attention to the coal-producing counties of Appalachia as an internal colony. Sociodemographic factors, economic distress, Core-Appalachia, and alcohol were used as predictors of homicide in the state. Using path analysis, it is argued that economic distress and Core-Appalachia predict homicide with alcohol acting as a significant intervening factor in the relationship. It is concluded that sociodemographic, subcultural, structural, and lifestyle factors are interrelated and predictive of overall homicide rates in the state. Treating the South as a uniform region is questioned.     

Desistance as a Developmental Process: A Comparison of Static and Dynamic Approaches

New research in the field of developmental criminology has led researchers to reconceptualize desistance as a behavioral process that unfolds over the life course. This approach puts more emphasis on the pathways by which people reach the state of non-offending, and less emphasis on the state of non-offending itself. This reconceptualization has implications for how we measure desistance in longi-tudinal data. In this paper, we suggest that the traditional measurement approach is inconsistent with this view, and we present an alternative measurement approach based on the premises of developmental criminology. Although not perfect, we argue that the dynamic measure better describes the key elements of the process of desistance. Both approaches are implemented using data from the Rochester Youth Development Study, a longitudinal study of youthful offenders. We demon-strate that the two approaches identify different people as desistors. Moreover, we argue that the dynamic definition of desistance has more promise for providing insight into the changes that are the behavioral focus of the desistance process.