Understanding Contemporary Cryptography and its Wider Impact upon the General Law

As the move toward the wider regulation of cryptography, both within the United Kingdom and elsewhere, becomes increasingly irresistible, the degree of understanding afforded to cryptography at the level of policy formation remains underdeveloped, ambiguous and, at times, misleading. One corollary of such solicitude is that a number of the most important and pervasive legal issues that flow naturally from the widespread availability of cryptography remain largely unexplored. This article attempts to remedy these deficiencies. It begins by offering a brief historical perspective before progressing to consider more substantive issues such as cryptography's aims, power, limitations, effectiveness and future. Ignoring, to a large extent, issues of law enforcement, and focusing, in particular, upon both the law of data protection, and, to a lesser extent, the general law of obligations in the United Kingdom, this article argues that the decision to utilise cryptography will not simply prove a matter of choice, preference or expediency, but of legal and commercial necessity in order to avoid the potential imposition of widespread indeterminate liability.     

The British consulate-general in Hanoi, 1954-73

Traditionally, there has been a rigid distinction made between British consular and diplomatic missions abroad: the former is concerned largely with trade, visas and the more mundane tasks of foreign representation, while the latter deals with the glamorous political world of interstate relationships at the highest level. As a general rule of thumb this may be true, but in accepting unequivocally this notion one overlooks those instances where a significant political role has been played by consulates. This article examines one such instance and in doing so raises questions relating to diplomatic and consular relations, disguised embassies, political reporting and the importance of experienced onsite personnel.     

Derrida and the Philosophy of Law and Justice

Readings of Derrida’s work on law and justice have tended to stress the distinction between them. This stress is complicated by Derrida’s own claim that it is not ‘a true distinction’. In this essay I argue that ordinary experiences of the inadequacy of existing laws do indeed imply a claim about what would be more just, but that this claim only makes sense insofar as one can appeal to another more adequate law (whether the projection of a new law or an existing ‘higher’ law). Exploring how Derrida negotiates a subtle path between classical Platonism and classical conventionalism about justice, the attempt is made to take seriously Derrida’s aim to affirm the idea of a ‘mystical’ foundation of the authority of laws by taking ‘the use of the word “mystical” in what I venture to call a rather Wittgensteinian direction’.     

Diplomatic innovation: Nasser and the origins of the interests section

This article examines the origins of the interests section and the indirect role played by Nasser in its creation. After providing a formal definition, it goes on to examine two case studies: first, the confluence of events that led to the first use by Egypt and West Germany in May 1965; second, the technical details involved in establishing the first British interests sections as occurred in the Anglo-Egyptian example of December 1965. It concludes that both case studies were innovative responses to unusual circumstances and offer potential gains for further research in the area of 'disguised' embassies.