Elemental analysis of soil samples for forensic purposes by inductively coupled plasma spectrometry--precision considerations

Major and trace elemental composition provides a powerful basis for forensic comparison of soils, sediments and rocks. However, it is important that the potential 'errors' associated with the procedures are fully understood and quantified, and that standard protocols are applied for sample preparation and analysis. This paper describes such a standard procedure and reports results both for instrumental measurement precision (repeatability) and overall 'method' precision (reproducibility). Results obtained both for certified reference materials and example soils show that the instrumental measurement precision (defined by the coefficient of variation, CV) for most elements is better than 2-3%. When different solutions were prepared from the same sample powder, and from different sub-sample powders prepared from the same parent sample, the CV increased to c. 5-6% for many elements. The largest variation was found in results for certified reference materials generated from 23 instrument runs over an 18 month period (mean CV=c. 11%). Some elements were more variable than others. W was found to be the most variable and the elements V, Cr, Co, Cu, Ni and Pb also showed higher than average variability. SiO2, CaO, Al2O3 and Fe2O3, Rb, Sr, La, Ce, Nd and Sm generally showed lower than average variability, and therefore provided the most reliable basis for inter-sample comparison. It is recommended that, whenever possible, samples relating to the same investigation should be analysed in the same sample run, or at least sequential runs.     

Incumbency effects in political campaigns

In this paper we examine two effects of incumbency. First, an incumbent may have an advantage in creating a favorable image in the eyes of the voters. Second, the incumbent may have to chose a position before the challenger; this second aspect of incumbency is modelled as Stackelberg leadership. In the model two candidates run for election by choosing a position in an ideological spectrum. Voters care about candidates' chosen positions as well as non-policy attributes of candidates, which we call charisma. Charismata are not known when candidates choose policy positions; they are only revealed on election day so that winning is not usually a certain prospect. Candidates care about the probability of winning but they also dislike compromising their own ideals.We find that the incumbent's equilibrium position is closer to his/her own ideal point than the equilibrium position of the game when moves are simultaneous. Also, for sufficiently large charismatic differences a natural leadership regime prevails: the candidate with the large charismatic advantage prefers being a leader to being a follower and the opponent prefers being a follower. If the difference in charismata is small both players prefer to be followers