Does corruption suppress voter turnout?*

This paper investigates to what extent voters’ perceptions of political corruption affect turnout. In previous research, two opposing views are put forward with regards to the relationship between corruption and turnout. On the one hand, corruption increases turnout because voters either are bought off to participate or because they are mobilized on clean government issues. On the other hand, corruption decreases turnout because presence of corruption corrodes the political system which leads to general cynicism, distrust and voter apathy. In this paper, we contribute to the existing research by adopting a multi-level approach to the relationship between corruption and turnout. We test the hypothesis that voters’ perceptions of corruption dampens turnout but that the effect is conditional upon the corruption context. We test our hypothesis by combining individual-level data and country-level data from 26 countries from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and country-level data from the Quality of Government Data Set. The findings show that perceiving corruption negatively affects turnout, but only in countries with low to medium levels of system corruption.     

Analyzing trade opening in Ukraine: effects of a customs union with the EU

This paper analyzes the possible effects of a customs union between Ukraine and the European Union. The GTAP multi-country simulation model of Purdue University’s Center for Global Trade Analysis is applied. The welfare measure evaluated is the change in equivalent variation (EV). As all incomes in the model accrue to a representative household, EV fully assesses possible welfare benefits for Ukraine from bilateral tariff elimination on trade with the EU. As the model includes Ukraine in the aggregated “Former Soviet Union” region (FSU), EV is estimated for the FSU and then disaggregated on the industry level proportionally to trade shares. The results of our simulations suggest that Ukraine’s EV is particularly sensitive to the inclusion of the agricultural sector into a customs union. Due to the highly protected nature of this sector within the EU, Ukraine would be better off if agriculture were excluded from liberalization. If this scenario is assumed, Ukraine’s monetary gain would be in the order of $40 million.

金融危机后的俄罗斯

普京治下的经济复苏,改善了俄罗斯的财政状况,提高了人民的生活水平,但没有使俄罗斯经济实现成功转型。全球金融危机暴露了俄罗斯经济状况的本质:普京八年的俄罗斯经济只是"恢复性增长",而非以投资和创新所驱动的可持续性增长,对能源仍然高度依赖。虽然危机之后俄经济有所恢复,但与能源价格上涨密切相关,其现代化进程任重道远。2012年之后的俄罗斯仍然将是一个缺少竞争力且严重依赖能源资源出口的国家。     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Society’s</Emphasis> Books of Note

Society’s Books of Note

Society’s Books of Note May/June 2010     

European security and early warning systems: from risks to threats in the European Union’s health security sector

This article critically examines a poorly understood aspect of the European security landscape: early warning systems (EWSs). EWSs are socio-technical systems designed to detect, analyse, and disseminate knowledge on potential security issues in a wide variety of sectors. We first present an empirical overview of more than 80 EWS in the European Union. We then draw on debates in Critical Security Studies to help us make sense of the role of such systems, tapping into conceptual debates on the construction of security issues as either “threat” or “risk” related. Finally, we study one EWS – the Early Warning and Response System for infectious diseases – to understand how it works and how it reconciles risk – versus threat-based security logics. Contrary to assumptions of a clear distinction between risk- and threat-based logics of security, we show that EWSs may serve as a “transmission belt” for the movement of issues from risk into threats.     

Cognitive dissonance and the effects of Voting Advice Applications on voting behaviour: evidence from the European Elections 2014

ABSTRACT

Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) – also known as Voting Engagement Applications – are online tools which inform users about their proximity to party positions before elections by indicating which parties are closest to the policy preferences of the individual voters. Referring to the theory of cognitive dissonance, this article examines the impact of using a VAA on voting behaviour by looking at the effect mechanisms. For the empirical analyses, we draw on data of a two-wave panel study we conducted before the European Elections 2014, thereby focusing on the German VAA – the Wahl-O-Mat. The findings show that irritation emerges if the preferred party is not positioned at the top of the VAA result list. In turn, a strong irritation can lead to a change in vote choice.     

Leisure,business and fantasy worlds: exploring donor-funded ‘youth spaces’ in southern Kyrgyzstan

This article explores the participation of university students in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other forms of association in the city of Osh, Kyrgyzstan. While the literature tends to criticize donor interventions in the post-Soviet space, an analysis of donor-funded youth projects calls for a more differentiated evaluation. It is argued that youth-oriented associations appeal to the students of Osh because these associations have created much needed ‘youth spaces’. In some cases, however, the appeal has little to do with the missions of the projects. Whatever the blueprints prepared by foreign donors, youth-oriented clubs and NGOs provide young people with opportunities for entrepreneurship, for leisure pursuits and for experimenting with their dreams and fantasies. Offering a case study of a group of students who have joined a donor-funded NGO, Students in Free Enterprise (SIFE), the article then charts the students' appropriation of this NGO.     

The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini

Persson and Tabellini (The Economic Effects of Constitutions, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2003) show that presidential regimes and majoritarian election systems have important economic effects. Here, the number of countries is expanded and more recent data is used. In replicating and extending their analyses, we find that the effect of presidential regimes vanishes almost entirely. With regard to electoral systems, the original results are largely confirmed: majoritarian (as opposed to proportional) electoral systems lead to lower government expenditure, lower levels of rent seeking but also lower output per worker. The institutional details, such as the proportion of candidates that are not elected on party lists and district size, are particularly important.     

Campaigns and the Selection of Policy-Seeking Representatives

Can voters learn meaningful information about candidates from their electoral campaigns? As with job market hiring, voters, like employers, cannot know the productivity of candidates, especially challengers, when they elect them. The real productivity of representatives only reveals itself after the election. We explore if the information revealed during the “hiring process” is a good signal of the legislative effort of elected representatives. In the incomplete information environment of election campaigns, candidates should turn to credible signals to indicate their “type” to voters. Campaigns—and campaigning—are means by which candidates can, in principle, signal their motivations to voters. Is a candidate’s behavior on the campaign trail informative about his or her behavior and effort as a legislator? Does it, for example, reveal whether a candidate will be more hard working and legislatively active? Using evidence from the European Parliament, we show that campaign activity prior to the election is not related to policy-seeking behavior in the legislature post-election. The finding also holds in two national-level settings and across a variety of measures of legislative effort. Those who campaign harder do seem more likely to win the election, but campaign effort seems to provide a poor guide to what the winner does once elected.