An experimental study of expressive voting

In this paper we report results of an initial attempt to test the theory of expressive voting. Our experiment involves requiring subjects to vote between receiving A in cash or havingA in cash or having B donated to charity on their behalf. Across subjects we vary the probability that their vote will decide which disbursement is made. As the probability of being decisive is lowered, the opportunity cost of giving expression to charitable sentiment decreases; hence, the likelihood of voting in accordance with such sentiment is expected to increase. We find weak support for the hypothesis, but the results do not replicate when we alter the parameter settings. Limitations of our design are discussed.This research was supported by the College of the Holy Cross and by a Procter & Gamble grant to the Department of Economics. We gratefully acknowledge the comments and contributions of James Andreoni, Geoffrey Brennan, George Kosicki, Michael Peddle, Tom Rietz, David Schap, James Shepperd, Royce Singleton, Todd Vladyka, Arlington Williams, an anonymous referee, and colleagues in our department research workshop.     

The 2003 Russian Duma election and the decline in rural support for the communist party

The December 2003 Duma election was a landmark in Russian elections, marking a significant decline in electoral support for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). This article explains the decline of support for the KPRF in the December 2003 election. Our specific focus is on the decline in rural support for the KPRF. This particular aspect is important because rural voters constituted a large portion of the KPRF's support throughout the 1990s. Using data from two rounds of surveys in several Russian regions, the article demonstrates that by 2003 the KPRF failed to capitalize on the ‘misery of the market,’ that is, to capture support from the ‘losers and malcontents’ during market reform, suggesting that KPRF supporters dealigned themselves from the party.     

Risky Inference: Unobserved Treatment Effects in Conflict Studies

This article illustrates the importance of testing empirical models in samples appropriate to the theories the models are intended to test. While social science appears to mandate that we prefer general theories to limited ones, the generality of a theory rests in its logical application to a set of observations, not solely to its statistical survival in a large data set. Theories in international relations, especially those linking domestic turmoil and international conflict, are advancing, but are sometimes applied to samples larger than the related theories indicate. This paper examines the statistical consequences of estimation in overexpansive samples with unmodeled treatment effects; we argue that samples containing cases that cannot experience the causal phenomenon in question produce unmodeled treatment effects, and we reexamine three published articles whose samples are perhaps broader than their theories suggest they should be. The empirical analyses demonstrate that overexpansive samples can produce somewhat misleading results: the new models produce interesting findings that emerge as treatment effects are identified.     

An explanation of the continuing federal government mandate of single-member congressional districts

A formal rational expectation model is developed to explain why congressional single-member districts (SMD’s) were mandated in 1842 and why that mandate has repeatedly been re-affirmed. The tendency of voters to moderate the dominant party in the federal government combined with the single-party sweep effect of multi-member districts (MMD’s) creates the incentives for the strongest party to support a SMD mandate. This model performs empirically much better than alternative theories. The model’s prediction that the current SMD mandate is permanent is an example of how an institutional change can endure even if it no longer reflects voter preferences.     

The Walsh contract for central bankers proves optimal after all!

A recent paper argues that the Walsh linear inflation contract does not prove optimal when the government concerns itself about the cost of the central bank contract (Candel-Sánchez & Campoy-Miñarro, 2004). This result relies on assuming that the participation constraint does not represent an effective constraint on the central banker’s decision. We show that the Walsh linear inflation contract does produce the optimal outcome, even when the government cares about the cost of the contract, assuming that the participation constraint holds.     

The Personal Fable and Risk-Taking in Early Adolescence

Elkind’s (1967) theory of adolescent egocentrism proposes two distinct, but related, constructs – the imaginary audience and the personal fable. A corollary to the imaginary audience, the personal fable (PF) yields a sense of invulnerability and speciality commonly associated with behavioral risk-taking. When regarded as a developmental phenomenon, risk-taking is thought to be the result of cognitive immaturity. However, few adolescent health programs address the egocentric dimension of decision making. We believe that a valid and reliable measure of PF would aid assessment of risk-taking potential and inform preventive interventions. The present paper reports the results of a newly constructed measure of PF and its relation to risk-taking behavior. The following three hypotheses were tested using data from an availability sample of 119 middle school students: 1. PF scores will increase with age; 2. males will score higher than females on the invulnerability dimension of PF; and 3. PF and risk-taking will be positively correlated. As predicted, PF scores increased significantly across the age range studied. Of the two PF dimensions, only invulnerability significantly varied across grades. Males reported significantly higher invulnerability scores than females, and PF and risk-taking were positively correlated. Suggestions for the implementation of this new and, arguably, reliable and valid scale are presented. Amy Alberts, M. A., is currently pursuing a doctoral degree in Applied Child Development at the Eliot-Pearson Department of Child Development, Tufts University. Ms. Alberts’ research interests include psychosocial adjustment during the pubertal transition and adolescent-parent relationships. David Elkind, Ph.D. is Professor of Child Development at Tufts University. His research has been in the areas of social and cognitive development, building upon the research and theory of Jean Piaget. His latest book, The Power of Play will be Published by DaCapo Press in 2007. I have served on the Editorial Board of the Journal of Youth and Adolescence for almost two decades. Although Dan and I have not always agreed on adolescent issues it has always been a responsible, mutually respecting disagreement. As an editor, Dan has always been sensitive, thoughtful and supportive, a pleasure to work with and for. Stephen Ginsberg is a senior at Tufts University and is currently applying to graduate programs in clinical psychology.     

The Future Role of the European Union in Europe's Development Assistance

This paper reviews the response of the European Commission to a number of critical assessments of its administration of the EU's development assistance programme. Focusing particularly upon the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of developing countries, it considers the recent Cotonou Agreement in the context of this reform agenda. It identifies those issues that remain unresolved, including the difficulties of developing objective criteria for assessing need and performance, the role of the Inter-service Quality Support Group and the relationship between the Directorate Generals for Development and External Relations. It identifies the conflicting objectives for development policy amongst the member states as lying at the heart of the EU's development policy problems and reviews the options that may present themselves should this reform programme fail to satisfy criticism from the member states.     

Burden sharing in the NATO alliance: An empirical test of alternative views

This paper undertakes an empirical test of two opposing views of interdependencies among members of military alliances. The first view, associated with Olson and Zeckhauser, argues that the public good aspect of defense induces free riding behavior by smaller alliance members, which imposes a disproportionate burden of supporting the alliance on the larger members. A second view argues that NATO defense activities produce a mix of outputs, some of which are not purely public, and some of which may be complementary across nations. Furthermore, the nature of the weapons systems and their relative use by alliance members may induce substantial cooperation by allies. The test proposed here analyzes the relationship between defense spending shares of NATO members and their population and relative wealth shares. A simple model is specified and tested using pooled time series cross sectional data. The empirical results indicate more support for the cooperative view of ally relationships than the Olson-Zeckhauser non-cooperative model.