Stammwähler und die opportunistische Wahl parteipolitischer Programme

This article explains political radicalism by the number of voters who are biased towards a party. With little voters biased in favor of a party, this party has to rely more heavily on its programmatic distance to other parties. Because large parties – i.e.: parties with a high number of biased voters – gain votes when they move to the center of the political spectrum, parties with a lower number of voters that are biased in their favor are forced to the edges of the policy space. We draw on a computational model of political competition between four parties in a two‐dimensional policy space to investigate this relationship. We use panel corrected OLS estimates to analyze the data generated by the computer simulation. Our results substantiate the hypothesis of a negative relationship between the number of biased voters and the inclination of a party to adopt a more extreme policy stance.     

Gender and Gender-Role Orientation Differences on Adolescents' Coping with Peer Stressors

Gender and gender-role orientation differences were explored on adolescents' coping with peer stressors. Eighth-grade and ninth-grade public junior high school students (N = 285) completed the COPE, reporting the strategies they recently used to deal with a stressful peer-related situation. Measures of gender-role orientation (Bem Sex-Role Inventory) and demographic information also were obtained. Factor analysis of the COPE revealed 4 distinct coping factors: active, avoidant, acceptance, and emotion-focused. The most frequently reported stressful event was arguments/fights with same-sex friends. Girls reported more arguments/fights with opposite-sex friends. Boys reported more physical fights and threats. Students' ratings of how much the situation mattered were used as a covariate in a MANCOVA to compare coping by gender and gender-role orientation, to control for perceived stressfulness of situations. Significant gender-role orientation differences were found for active, acceptance, and emotion-focused coping.     

Kapital oder Kompensation? Erwerbsbiografien von Männern und die sozialen Beziehungen zu Verwandten und Freunden

Der Beitrag behandelt die Auswirkungen unterschiedlicher Beschäftigungsverhältnisse und berufsbiografischer Erfahrungen auf die Integration in soziale Beziehungen, insbesondere solche zu Freunden und Verwandten. Ein wichtiger Aspekt sind hierbei Erfahrungen von Diskontinuität und Unsicherheit auf dem Arbeitsmarkt, die nach Sennett auf den Bereich persönlicher Beziehungen übergreifen und die Integration in enge, verlässliche Beziehungen erschweren. Dem gegenüber gibt es allerdings auch theoretische Argumente für eine Kompensation berufsbiografischer Unsicherheiten durch eine verstärkte Hinwendung zu engen und stabilen Primärbeziehungen. Empirische Analysen mit den Daten des Familiensurvey 2000 zeigen sowohl negative Auswirkungen als auch kompensatorische Zusammenhänge, wobei letzteres wohl nur dann möglich ist, wenn das Unsicherheitsniveau nicht ein bestimmtes Maß übersteigt bzw. individuelle Bewältigungsressourcen vorhanden sind. Überraschenderweise sind nicht primär die Verwandtschaftsund Familienbeziehungen Basis solcher kompensatorischer Zusammenhänge, sondern Freundschaften.     

Groups,Growth and Trust: Cross-Country Evidence on the Olson and Putnam Hypotheses

Olson (1982) and Putnam (1993) providesharply conflicting perspectives on theimpact of private associations on economicwell-being and social conflict. Olson(1982) emphasized their propensity to actas special interest groups that lobby forpreferential policies, imposingdisproportionate costs on the rest ofsociety. Putnam (1993) viewed membershipsin horizontal associations as a source ofgeneralized trust and social ties conduciveto governmental efficiency and economicperformance. Using cross-country data,this paper investigates the impact ofassociational memberships on generalizedtrust and economic performance, findinglittle support for Olson's view of theimpact of groups, and only mixed supportfor the Putnam perspective.     

'Appropriate' Policy Knowledge, and Institutional and Governance Implications

The papers in this special section of AJPA are the product of a symposium held in Brisbane in February 2003, which was jointly sponsored by the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland and the Queensland Department of Premier and Cabinet. Three papers were delivered. David Adams, from the Victorian Public Service, delivered a paper entitled 'Usable knowledge and public policy'. Wayne Parsons, from the University of London, gave a paper 'Not just steering but weaving: Relevant knowledge and the craft of building policy capacity'. Randal Stewart, a policy consultant based in Sydney, gave a paper entitled 'Public sector reform knowledge production'. The purposes of this paper are to highlight salient points from the papers and to assess briefly the institutional and governance implications of taking at last some steps beyond the currently prevailing rationalist approaches to policy and governance.     

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contracting approach to centralbanking in a simple common agency model. We suggest thatcentral banker contracts that do not consider the possibilityof more than one principal existing are incomplete contracts.Such incomplete contracts can be a poor form ofmonetary policy delegation under common agency. We develop amodel with two principals – society (government) and ageneric interest group, whose objective conflicts withsociety’s ex ante preferences by incorporating an inflationarybias. We determine when the government-offered orinterest-group-offered contract dominates the central banker’sdecision. The results largely depend on whether theinterest-group-offered contract is written in terms of outputor inflation.     

Demokratie, Autokratie und die regulative Gestaltung der Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen in Entwicklungsländern

This paper investigates into the political determinants of trade policy regulation in developing countries. When choosing between the trade policy instruments tariffs and quota governments consider the effects of these policies on their political support from interest groups and voters. It is argued that quantitative restrictions become increasingly less attractive as a country democratizes. Instead, motives of revenue generation gain importance. Therefore, the likelihood of democratic governments choosing quota is smaller than for their autocratic counterparts. Empirical tests based on a sample of 75 developing countries for the years 1979–1998 support the hypothesis.