全文获取类型
| 收费全文 | 1352篇 |
| 免费 | 30篇 |
专业分类
| 各国政治 | 50篇 |
| 工人农民 | 73篇 |
| 世界政治 | 151篇 |
| 外交国际关系 | 105篇 |
| 法律 | 584篇 |
| 中国政治 | 5篇 |
| 政治理论 | 409篇 |
| 综合类 | 5篇 |
出版年
| 2024年 | 4篇 |
| 2023年 | 8篇 |
| 2022年 | 6篇 |
| 2021年 | 12篇 |
| 2020年 | 26篇 |
| 2019年 | 35篇 |
| 2018年 | 42篇 |
| 2017年 | 42篇 |
| 2016年 | 56篇 |
| 2015年 | 33篇 |
| 2014年 | 35篇 |
| 2013年 | 192篇 |
| 2012年 | 30篇 |
| 2011年 | 46篇 |
| 2010年 | 24篇 |
| 2009年 | 36篇 |
| 2008年 | 43篇 |
| 2007年 | 65篇 |
| 2006年 | 47篇 |
| 2005年 | 36篇 |
| 2004年 | 38篇 |
| 2003年 | 37篇 |
| 2002年 | 44篇 |
| 2001年 | 37篇 |
| 2000年 | 26篇 |
| 1999年 | 17篇 |
| 1998年 | 20篇 |
| 1997年 | 20篇 |
| 1996年 | 22篇 |
| 1995年 | 14篇 |
| 1994年 | 25篇 |
| 1993年 | 20篇 |
| 1992年 | 15篇 |
| 1991年 | 21篇 |
| 1990年 | 16篇 |
| 1989年 | 16篇 |
| 1988年 | 23篇 |
| 1987年 | 13篇 |
| 1986年 | 21篇 |
| 1985年 | 11篇 |
| 1984年 | 21篇 |
| 1983年 | 9篇 |
| 1982年 | 14篇 |
| 1981年 | 9篇 |
| 1980年 | 6篇 |
| 1979年 | 8篇 |
| 1978年 | 8篇 |
| 1977年 | 9篇 |
| 1975年 | 7篇 |
| 1974年 | 6篇 |
排序方式： 共有1382条查询结果，搜索用时 0 毫秒
21.
Steven Stack 《American Journal of Criminal Justice》1995,19(2):197-214
Previous work testing the criminal opportunity/routine activities theory of burglary has been marked by three recurrent problems:
(1) a neglect of testing the theory in rural areas (2) the use of indicators which confound opportunity with disorganization
effects (3) failure to control for alternative theories of burglary. The present paper contributes to the literature by correcting
these shortcomings. The results of a multiple regression analysis of county level data from Michigan indicate that the greater
the criminal opportunity, the greater the rate of burglary. These results are independent of indicators taken from economic
strain and social disorganization theories. The model explains 69% of the variance in burglary rates overall and 84% of the
variance in rural counties. While there may be higher levels of social cohesion and lower anonymity in rural areas, these
factors are not sufficient to offset the influence of criminal opportunity. 相似文献
22.
23.
A Re-examination of the Effects of Biased Lineup Instructions in Eyewitness Identification 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
Clark SE 《Law and human behavior》2005,29(5):575-604
A meta-analytic review of research comparing biased and unbiased instructions in eyewitness identification experiments showed
an asymmetry; specifically, that biased instructions led to a large and consistent decrease in accuracy in target-absent lineups,
but produced inconsistent results for target-present lineups, with an average effect size near zero (Steblay, 1997). The results
for target-present lineups are surprising, and are inconsistent with statistical decision theories (i.e., Green & Swets, 1966).
A re-examination of the relevant studies and the meta-analysis of those studies shows clear evidence that correct identification
rates do increase with biased lineup instructions, and that biased witnesses make correct identifications at a rate considerably
above chance. Implications for theory, as well as police procedure and policy, are discussed. 相似文献
24.
Judith V. Becker Meg S. Kaplan Jerry Cunningham-Rathner Richard Kavoussi 《Journal of family violence》1986,1(1):85-97
Adolescent incest sexual perpetrators seen at an out-patient clinic were interviewed regarding demographic characteristics and occurrence of deviant and nondeviant sexual behaviors. Results indicate that subjects (1) committed more sexual crimes than they had been arrested for, (2) reported a very early onset of sexual behavior, (3) had additional DSM-III psychiatric disorders, and (4) reported previous sexual victimization. Recommendations for future research are made. 相似文献
25.
Throughout the 1990s, corruption cases, policy failure and scandals tarnished Belgium's international reputation. In this article, we analyse the effect of federalism and political culture on corruption and policy failures and their impact on the likelihood of such occurrences becoming scandals. Survey material suggests that there are few differences between French- and Dutch-speakers in the perception and tolerance of corruption. We then list a number of variables that can explain corruption in Belgium and argue that the independent effect of federalism is very limited. Next we demonstrate that federalism has played a much more significant role in lowering the risk of policy failure, while at the same time creating a few new vulnerabilities. Finally, we argue that the regional political elites do not often engage in policy learning and frequently put forward federalism as the main solution to the avoidance of policy failure and scandal. In this sense, regional political elites do not seize the opportunity for policy experimentation and transfer that is generally seen as one of the main virtues of a federal system of government. 相似文献
26.
27.
This article focuses on the apocalyptic zeitgeist of the Islamic State through the lens of what we call the New Tribalism. It finds that IS emerged from the Al Qaeda (AQ) milieu, but soon split with AQ as the messianic excitement surrounding Al-Baghdadi and his teachings grew. In common with previous millennial/messianic movements in all three “Peoples of the Book”—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—IS soon evolved beyond the laws of the normative faith (antinomianism). We hold that for this reason, despite its claims of faith and fealty, IS has left the Islamic Umah behind, becoming a malign sectarian group of its own whose dynamism and successes are attracting a global audience and support from Muslims in almost every country. This helps to explain such abhorrent practices as forced conversion, sexual servitude, the destruction of historic artifacts, and mass executions. We find that the American invasion of Iraq was the vital first step in a series of events, which gave birth to IS. A thorough review of IS history and political culture traces these historic moments in time. 相似文献
28.
29.
Abstract In July 1977, newly elected President Jimmy Carter suddenly found himself confronted with a difficult neutron bomb decision. With a narrow victory in Congress, pro neutron‐bomb forces had successfully presented the President with the authority to proceed with production. Unfortunately, as the months passed, Carter failed to move swiftly with production of the neutron warheads which many NATO alliance members saw as a much needed deterrent to the Warsaw PACT'S massive armor superiority. Confronted with mounting international and domestic opposition to the neutron weapon, Jimmy Carter, in the fall of 1977, insisted that the NATO allies officially support American production of the warheads before the United States would produce it. Spurred on by Carter's indecision and by certain NATO members’ reluctance to officially support the weapon, the Soviet Union shifted its propaganda machine into high gear in a massive effort to sway international opinion against the weapon. During the first few months of 1978, Western Europe saw a flood of protests against this so‐called “inhumane” weapon. Domestic communist and left‐wing socialist opposition to the neutron bomb precipitated a precarious right‐left split within many Western European socialist parties. Nowhere was this split more graphically illustrated than within the ruling West German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his moderate technocrats basically favored the neutron bomb, but feared crippling left‐wing SPD opposition and possible defections if West Germany complied with American demands to break with over 30 years of U.S.‐West German nuclear precedent and agree officially to American production of a nuclear weapon, the neutron bomb. Only after much American cajoling did the allies move toward official NATO support for production. Carter had failed to understand the disastrous political implications which left‐wing opposition had created within the NATO countries and refused to let Schmidt and other leaders off the hook. And then in an amazing move, after Schmidt and the NATO allies had risked political ruin to reach an agreement to support the neutron bomb, President Carter pulled the rug from under them on April 7,1978, when he indefinitely delayed a decision on the weapon. With this decision, Carter had set a dangerous precedent by yielding to Soviet pressure and had missed an opportunity to win the favor of skeptical NATO allies and critics who asserted he was too weak and indecisive. But above all, Carter had unnecessarily alienated and angered NATO leaders like Schmidt who risked possible political ruin by supporting the neutron bomb. 相似文献
30.