Getting Performance from Performance Management: A Framework for Strategic Management Choices

The choices for optimal performance management depend upon the circumstances – there is no single ideal management approach. The principals have three basic tools available to encourage high performance from subordinate entities: they can delegate authority, impose rewards or sanctions, and/or develop (or enhance) a performance measurement system. These tools allow the principals to motivate, delegate, educate, reevaluate, and/or reassign the agent in order to generate increased learning and improved outcomes from the program. Thus, depending on the nature of the agency culture and the quality of the performance measures, different managerial responses will have different results.     

Structure and Process: Examining the Interaction between Bureaucratic Organization and Analytical Requirements

Attempts by politicians to control bureaucratic decisions include both structural (how is the agency making the decision organized?) and procedural (what rules must they follow when making the decision?). But how do these two modes of influence interact? This article examines the interaction between bureaucratic structure and one procedural control, the requirement that agencies conduct an analysis of their decisions prior to their issuance. I look at this interaction in the context of two types of analysis, cost‐benefit analysis and environmental impact assessment. I interview 16 individuals in each field and draw from their experiences of conducting and reviewing more than a thousand analyses. The conduct of analysis is affected by where analysts are placed in agencies. In particular, independence of analysts has a trade‐off. The more independent analysts are, the more likely they can challenge preferred decisions in their agency. But independent analysts are brought into decisions later and their independence may limit their long‐term impacts on agency culture. Despite this trade‐off, analysts expressed a clear preference for independence. The interaction between different controls of bureaucratic behavior is a potentially fruitful line for further research.     

What's wrong with the back of the envelope? A call for simple (and timely) benefit–cost analysis

Observers across the ideological spectrum have criticized benefit–cost analysis for as long as it has been part of the rulemaking process. Still, proponents and detractors agree that analysis has morphed into a mechanism often used by agencies to justify regulatory decisions already made. We argue that a simpler analysis of more alternatives conducted earlier in the regulatory process can resuscitate it as a tool to inform policy. Recognizing that requiring a procedure does not ensure that regulators will follow it, we offer possible remedies, including strengthening or relaxing subsequent review of proposed rules, which raise the cost of circumventing the reform or lower the cost of following it.     

The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union – A Lesson in How Not to Make Policy

This article considers some salient theoretical contributions which bear upon our understanding of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union (EU). It outlines the fundamental dilemma highlighted in game theory known as 'the tragedy of the commons' and goes on to examine whether the CFP can be construed as a 'policy fiasco'. The article considers how the fisheries of the EU could be more effectively managed and underlines the urgent need for international collective action. With the mismatch between the CFP and the scale of the problem it is intended to address firmly in sight, the article concludes with an evaluation and some policy suggestions.     

Fashion and feminism

Valerie Steele, Fashion and Eroticism: Ideals of Beauty from the Victorian Era to the Jazz Age (Oxford University Press), New York, 1985; Elizabeth, Wilson, Adorned in Dreams: Fashion and Modernity (Virago), London, 1985.