Great Power War: Historical Inevitability or Deterrable Choice?

Proponents of a wide range of power transition theories suggest that conflict between the United States and China is inevitable. History indicates that is not true and conflict can be deterred. A key element to that deterrence is an effective Alliance strategy. While the Obama Administration has outlined an effective deterrent national strategy, it has not provided any military strategy. Some have proposed Air Sea Battle can be that strategy. For a variety of reasons, ASB will not work. This article proposes the Alliance adopt Offshore Control as a military strategy to deter China and assure allies and friends in the region. It is based on the concept of defending the first island chain, denying China use of the seas inside the first island chain and dominating the seas outside it. Its deterrent power is enhanced because Offshore Control is affordable, politically feasible, and can be executed today.     

A Political Science of Punishment: Francis Lieber and the Discipline of American Prisons

This article examines the history of political science in relation to the history of the prison. It considers how theories of the state in political science have assumed that proper states should punish with prisons, and traces these ideas to the work of Francis Lieber, the first academic political scientist in the USA. Because his ideas about prison reform were central to his conceptualization of the discipline as a science of punishment, his theory of the state is an understudied part of the history of mass incarceration. Lieber argued that the state had a moral duty to punish its citizens with the prison, and an obligation to manage the risks of democracy through the prison's principles of scientific certainty, less eligibility, and disciplinary solitude. By examining the life and work of Francis Lieber, this article offers new ways of thinking about political science's past, and its status as part of the history of the American prison.     

Affordability and mortgage design: Permanent buydowns and buyups

Abstract

A simulation model that mirrors the actual practices of lenders in setting qualification requirements for mortgage loans is used to assess the impact of permanent buydowns and buyups on the maximum sale price that buyers can afford. Buydowns are reductions in the coupon rate traded off against higher discount points; buyups are the reverse. Although buydowns have little effect on afford ability, buyups can have significant effects. Their potential is largely unrealized, however, because of the call risk to lenders of loans carrying premiums. The authors propose a “discount recovery” provision, which would be similar to a prepayment penalty except that the payment upon prepayment would be tied to the amount of the discount foregone by the lender. This would protect lenders against call risk, giving them every reason to offer buyups as a way of expanding demand.