Strategic agricultural trade policy interdependence and the exchange rate: A game theoretic analysis

Strategic Agricultural Trade Policy Interdependence is modeled using a game theoretic framework. The model distinguishes between the European Community, the United States and a politically passive rest-of-the-world. Particular emphasis is placed on the effect of the exchange rate on the equilibrium outcome of this game. Without compensatory payments to those with the highest political influence, the results suggest that only modest reform is possible. With compensation, liberalization occurs but free trade is not obtained. Simulations also indicate that the U.S. gains incentive to reduce protection given a depreciation of the dollar, while incentive to liberalize trade policies decreases as the dollar appreciates. Research was supported by Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station project 14065 “Economic Integration and Disintegration in Europe: Implications for U.S. Agriculture.”     

A NEW PARLIAMENT HOUSE — A NEW PARLIAMENTARY ORDER*

Abstract: The physical design and location of the existing Parliament House has influenced the evolution of Australia's parliamentary system. The new Parliament House will exert a new set of influences. The Executive will assume an entrenched position within its own enclave and Ministers will be physically more remote from backbenchers. The physical arrangements of the Executive entrance and the Prime Minister's suite will encourage a presidential-style status in the office. But the architecture also emphasises the public's access to Parliament in the spirit of Burley Griffin's original conception. There is likely to be a strong “congressional” impetus arising from the prominence given to committee room space and backbencher facilities. Tensions between the Executive and Parliament will be exacerbated. Changes to procedures and to parliamentary administration are also likely to flow from the new layout and facilities. The new building will provide an impetus for widespread parliamentary reform.     

Is There a Future for Contracting in the Australian Public Sector?

Contracting has moved from the margins to the centre of public management. Significant sections of the public workforce, from benefits delivery to corporate services, now find their functions open to tender. Governments prefer to concentrate on policy analysis and development, leaving service delivery to the market. As purchasers rather than providers, governments are redefining the role and scope of the state. But are Australian governments ready for this shift to contracting? Do they possess the full array of control and reporting mechanisms necessary if contracting is to deliver its promised benefits? There are significant difficulties finding evidence that answers such questions. Yet on the basis of concerns discussed across Australian jurisdictions, it appears contracting has developed so quickly it outstrips the capacity of government to monitor what is happening, and so learn from mistakes. In time governments will become better at maintaining accountability for contracted functions, because experience reduces the risks of moral hazard.     

The Effect of Family Structure and Family Functioning on Adolescents' Perceptions of Intimate Time Spent with Parents,Siblings, and Peers

In previous research, family structure variables have been operationalized as family size, birth order, sibling spacing, and sibling density. These structure variables have been linked to parental strictness, reasonableness, and supportiveness [J. S. Kidwell (1981), Number of Siblings, Sibling Spacing, and Birth Order: Their Effects on Perceived Parent–Adolescent Relationships, Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 43, pp. 315–333]. Other research has drawn attention to the link between the amount of time adolescents spend with parents and peers and the influence of family relations variables—intensity, duration, and frequency of conflicts. [R. Montemayor (1982), The Relationship Between Parent–Adolescent Conflict and the Amount of Time Adolescents Spend Alone and with Parents and Peers, Child Development, Vol. 53, pp. 1512–1519]. More recent research has related family structure (family size, sibling spacing, and gender) effects to the amount of time adolescents spend with parents, a measure of relationship quality, and a set of measures of discipline [R. A. Richardson et al. (1986), Parent–Child Relationships in Early Adolescence: Effects of Family Structure, Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 48, pp. 805–811]. To date, the questions asked by researchers have not simultaneously explored whether it is the family relations or the family structure variables that contribute most powerfully to the amount of time that female and male adolescents spend with family members and peers. In this research adolescents were asked to report the amount of time they spend with their mother, father, siblings, and peers, and to respond to a questionnaire that has three factors that define family functioning: Parenting Style (democratic decision making), Intimacy, and Conflict [P. Noller et al. (1992), Parent and Adolescent Perceptions of Family Functioning: A Comparison of Clinic and Nonclinic Family, Journal of Adolescence, Vol. 15, pp. 101–115]. The analyses revealed that complex and interpretable family structure and family functioning factors differentially influence whether males and females spend time with family members and peers.     

The Politics and economics of revenue growth: A cross–national analysis

Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross–national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross–national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990.We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, 'fiscal illusion', elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958—1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct–tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We find no support for 'fiscal illusion' and ideological theories of revenue growth.