One-dimensionality and stability in legislative voting

The widespread use in legislative studies of the one-dimensional model and its median-stability consequence raises a question: Do stability and one-dimensionality rest on evidence drawn from observed votes? They do not and cannot. I prove that every possible legislative history is compatible with a transitive majority preference (hence stability), and except in very special circumstances with a cyclic majority preference (hence instability) as well: observed votes can never refute and almost never confirm stability. One-dimensionality fares worse: any legislative history is compatible with the one-dimensional model if it includes no two votes with overlapping pairs of alternatives, but otherwise, I show, it is almost certainly incompatible with the model, even in those rare cases that ensure transitivity. Voting evidence aside, the one-dimensional model is unduly restrictive, and arguments in its defense do not survive scrutiny.     

Budgetary Politics and Veto Players

In this article we examine whether and how the policy‐oriented coalition building and the gridlock model of legislative choice explain changes in the allocation of German budgetary items between 1961 and 1994. The policy‐oriented coalition‐building approach suggests that only policy‐connected budgetary actors can make changes in the budgetary composition, while the location of the status quo is essential for budgetary modifications according to the gridlock model. We also draw the attention to the identification of the set of relevant budgetary veto players and their preferences by distinguishing between models of the government, the political parties of the Bundestag, and the two of them. We test the predictive power of these approaches and conceptions in a competitive manner and control for macroeconomic and other political factors that might influence changes in the budgetary allocation. Our findings show that the gridlock model better explains budgetary changes, and that the government is responsible for decreasing, but the political parties of the Bundestag majority are decisive for increasing the size of budgetary items. We conclude that identifying the relevant veto players and using these more sophisticated approaches on budgetary decision making provide significant insights into the political reasons for changing the allocation of the German budget.     

Staatseingriffe im Markt fuer Versicherung gegen Naturkatastrophen

Wir fassen kurz die wichtigsten Ergebnisse unserer Länderstudien im Gebäudeversicherungsmarkt zusammen. Wir versuchen aus unseren Beobachtungen Schlüsse zu ziehen, wie die Versicherung gegen Naturkatastrophen institutionell organisiert werden sollte. Wir kommen zum Ergebnis, dass aus Gründen der Effizienz (niedrigere Verwaltungs‐ und Vertriebskosten) und um Probleme der Risikoselektion zu vermeiden, öffentlichen Monopolen auf diesem Markt eine wichtige Rolle zukommen sollte. Ein weiterer gewichtiger Vorteil der Monopollösung ist die Tatsache, dass diese Institutionen starke Anreize haben, sich für eine effiziente Prävention einzusetzen.     

Germany

European Journal of Political Research -     

Federalism and the Safety Net: Delinkage and Participation Rates

Since the enactment of welfare reform legislation in 1996, thefederal government and the states have emphasized putting theneedy to work and reducing caseloads. Simultaneously, however,national policymakers delinked eligibility for cash assistancefrom eligibility for other safety-net benefits. Contrary tostated policy, though, this delinkage has led to declining participationin the case of Food Stamps and health-insurance programs forlow-income children. We highlight four factors that states mustshape if they are to narrow this gap between policy promiseand program performance by fostering higher participation. Weshow how our focus intersects with enduring questions of Americanfederalism—the level of state commitment to redistributiveprograms, their capacity to implement these programs effectively,and the degree to which states can augment governing capacityby becoming more genuine laboratories of democracy.     

The checks and balances of party federalism: German federal government in a divided legislature

In this study, we assess the potential for policy change of the German government of Helmut Kohl after unification combining party positions with formal bicameral settings in a spatial model of legislative action. We distinguish between two policy areas and two types of legislation, mandatory and non–mandatory legislation imposing either a symmetric or asymmetric power distribution between both German chambers. In order to identify German legislators' party positions in different policy areas, we use data from ECPR Party Manifesto research covering the period from German unification in 1990 to the end of the government of Helmut Kohl in 1998. We find that the federal government of Helmut Kohl had a policy leadership position until April 1991 with no procedural differences, but the gridlock danger for governmental proposals was higher on the societal than the economic dimension. Afterwards, the government's potential for policy change was considerably determined by the type of legislation, independently from the policy dimension. At the end of the Kohl era, the governmental policy leadership position was limited to policies that left even the opposition majority of German states better off. The procedural settings mattered greatly on the economic dimension, and the danger of gridlock on societal policy was smaller only for non–mandatory legislation.