Demanding the Impossible: War,Bargaining, and Honor

This article shows that honor concerns can influence war initiation and termination decisions. When bargaining implicates status or commitments to in-group members, moral nationalists may experience dishonor—and with it emotions like shame and humiliation—when they have to make concessions. These honor costs are different from other costs because they can sometimes be vindicated through costly action. Including these costs in a basic, complete information bargaining model demonstrates that honor concerns can give rise to a “fight, then agree” equilibrium. These influences of honor on war initiation and termination are illustrated with case studies of British decisions in the 1982 Falklands War and French decisions during the 1940 invasion of France.     

Copping out: Why police officers decline to participate in the sergeant’s promotional process

This work examines why police officers decline to participate in the first-line supervisor promotional process to the rank of sergeant. A mail survey, followed by focus group discussions, provides evidence that not seeking advancement is driven by considerations of family, lifestyle choices, and satisfaction with current assignment. Eligible officers who do not seek promotion may be more internally motivated and not driven by the extrinsic rewards attendant to upward mobility.     

Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence

Using a panel of 22 OECD countries over the 1971–1996period, this paper extends previous literature on the effectsof fragmented government on fiscal policy outcomes in variousdirections. First, we focus on data relating to centralgovernment as alltheories refer to central government. Second, we also examinegovernment's position vis-à-vis parliament andgovernment's political fragmentation. We find evidence thatmore fragmented governmentshave higher deficits, while governments that have a largemajority in parliament have lower deficits. Right-winggovernments appear to have been fiscally more responsible inthe seventies. Political fragmentation does not affect agovernment's budget deficit.     

An analysis of rent-seeking games with relative-payoff maximizers

In this paper, we introduce relative-payoff maximizing firms into the Tullock model of rent-seeking. These firms try to realize higher (expected) payoff than other firms. As a consequence of this, the outcome of the model changes: Firms, on average, will invest more in the rent-seeking process, the rate of dissipation of the rent becomes independent of the number of rent-seekers, dissipation becomes complete in cases where underdissipation prevails in the original model.     

Who will guard the guardians? Amartya Sen's contribution to development evaluation

An Action Learning process integrated with Sen's Capability Approach can support development agencies to formulate interventions that enhance freedom. The authors show that putting this approach into practice has important implications for the manner in which ‘development’ is undertaken as an ideological project. It may help to examine and challenge those who hold power in development: the guardians. This finding is the result of an emergent Action Learning process that was initiated by applying Sen's principles to focus-group interviews with women who care for people affected by HIV and AIDS. One of the findings of these focus groups was that the participants valued the process because it opened a space for them to influence the work of the implementing NGO. Essentially, they could hold the implementing agency to account. Reflection on this outcome by the agency led to important shifts in processes that are more supportive of freedom.