United States Responses to the Soviet Suppression of Rebellions in the German Democratic Republic,Hungary, and Czechoslovakia

Under Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson, the United States refrained from intervening during the three major Cold War crises in the Soviet bloc in 1953, 1956, and 1968. The uprisings in the German Democratic Republic and Hungary came at a contentious stage of the Cold War. In 1968 East–West relations were again groping towards détente and, the Czechoslovak Communist Party unleashed an ambitious reform agenda under Alexander Dub?ek. On 20 August, a massive military invasion by Warsaw Pact forces squashed the reform spirit. All three challenges to Soviet control on the periphery of its Cold War empire followed power struggles in the Kremlin and intimations of a slackening of the reigns of control in Moscow. Eastern Europe was terra incognita for most Americans, and the United States had never pursued an active policy in Eastern Europe. All three crisis scenarios were overshadowed by crises in other parts of the world—part of larger arcs of crises the superpowers were confronting simultaneously. The three crises also coincided, domestically, with intense presidential election politics. Washington ultimately respected the Yalta arrangements and tolerated the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Next to grudging respect for the Yalta outcomes, the ultimate spectre of mutual destruction in a nuclear war “compelled” the superpowers towards co-existence and, ultimately, in 1989, the satellite states had to liberate themselves.     

Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Judicial Review

The role of the courts in the review of administrative rulemaking raises profound questions as to the legitimate interference of courts in the exercise of administrative activities, which are often carried out in the pursuance of a legislative mandate. In contrast to the review of administrative acts of individual application, the Union courts have shown a more hesitant approach in the review of administrative rulemaking activities. This contribution will discuss the review by the Union courts of administrative rulemaking for compliance with procedural as well as substantive standards and will explore whether a convincing rationale for their more deferential attitude to the review of administrative rules can be provided. The article will explore to what extent lessons can be learned from the jurisprudence of the federal courts in the USA, which have struggled, even after the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), with similar problems.