Transfers from prison to hospital under Sections 47 and 48 of the Mental Health Act between 2011 and 2014

In England and Wales, prisoners with mental disorder of such severity as to warrant inpatient treatment may be transferred to hospital under the Mental Health Act. UK Government guidance recommends that this process should be completed within 14 days; however, evidence suggests that in many cases it can take much longer. This retrospective service evaluation of 64 male prisoners, who were transferred under Section 47 or Section 48, aimed to evaluate transfer durations. The mean time from referral to admission was 76 days. Prisoners with a psychotic disorder were admitted more quickly. Remand prisoners were admitted more quickly than sentenced prisoners. Findings suggest that, in the UK the transfer time of prisoners under Sections 47 and 48 of the Mental Health Act continues to far exceed the 14-day target which raises concern about equivalence of care for prisoners. Our findings support arguments for fundamental amendments to the admissions process.     

Theories of Criminalization

In this article, I comment on Simester and von Hirsch’s theory of criminalization and discuss general principles of criminalization. After some brief comments on punishment theories and the role of moral wrongdoing, I examine main lines of contemporary criminalization theories which tend to focus on the issues of harm, offense, paternalism and side-constraints. One of the points of disagreement with Simester and von Hirsch concerns the role of the harm principle. I rely on a straightforward normative concept of “rights of others,” not in the sense of rights granted in positive law but in the sense of rights which are to be justified in political philosophy. With a rights-centered rather than a harm-centered approach, a prima facie reason for criminalization is the violation of others’ rights. It is unnecessary to develop a separate category of “offense to others,” and paternalistic interventions can be criticized straightforwardly because rights can be waived.     

Policing the ‘suspects’: Ottoman Greeks and Armenians in Istanbul, 1914–18

During the First World War, a primary domestic political aim for all belligerent countries was to preserve the socio-economic status quo in order to provide appropriate conditions for the survival of the state. Therefore, war governments paid particular attention to the maintenance of internal order. While doing this, the central authority of governments became paramount and this situation had remarkable repercussions on state–society relations. This article examines the wartime public order policies of the Ottoman government specifically concerning the Ottoman Greeks (Rum) and Armenians living in Istanbul. During the Great War, these non-Muslim elements were officially regarded as ‘suspects’, in other words, as ‘potential political criminals’ threatening the internal order of the capital. To control the Ottoman Greeks and Armenians, the war government implemented a number of policing strategies that consisted of deportation of individuals and groups, strict control on travel, and close surveillance of ‘suspects’.     

Local demands and state policies: general councils (Meclis-i Umumi) in the Edirne and Ankara provinces (1867–1872)

By comparing the decisions of various meetings of the General Councils of Edirne and Ankara provinces from 1283 to 1288 (1867–1872 AD), this study analyses social and economic dynamics of both provinces, the state vocabulary for handling local demands, and the boundaries of responsibility for the state and the local actors in provincial administration. Instead of reading the Tanzimat as a top-down imposition, this article defines General Councils as sites of negotiations between state and local actors and instruments for local development. This article challenges the conventional view of provincial councils as weak and unable to implement various policies. It contributes to a new generation of studies that challenges the separation between state and social forces and looks at how both interacted in provincial administration.     

Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies

Abstract. Parliamentary democracy has been widely embraced by politicians and especially by the scholarly community but remains less widely understood. In this essay, I identify the institutional features that define parliamentary democracy and suggest how they can be understood as delegation relationships. I propose two definitions: one minimal and one maximal (or ideal–typical). In the latter sense, parliamentary democracy is a particular regime of delegation and accountability that can be understood with the help of agency theory, which allows us to identify the conditions under which democratic agency problems may occur. Parliamentarism is simple, indirect, and relies on lessons gradually acquired in the past. Compared to presidentialism, parliamentarism has certain advantages, such as decisional efficiency and the inducements it creates toward effort. On the other hand, parliamentarism also implies disadvantages such as ineffective accountability and a lack of transparency, which may cause informational inefficiencies. And whereas parliamentarism may be particularly suitable for problems of adverse selection, it is a less certain cure for moral hazard. In contemporary advanced societies, parliamentarism is facing the challenges of decaying screening devices and diverted accountabilities.     

Divide et impera: Strategic underpricing in privatizations

In several recent initial public offerings in privatization casesshares seemed to be severely underpriced. In this paper weprovide a political economy explanation for this apparentunderpricing. Using a variant of Grossmann and Helpmann's (1996)model of special interest politics, we demonstrate thatgovernments may raise their election chances by rationinginvestors because the resulting broader distribution of sharesmakes regulation that is favorable to the privatized firm morepopular. Somewhat surprisingly, even revenues from theprivatization can be increased through rationing. The model alsoexplains the common practice of bonus systems designed to preventinvestors from taking profits immediately.     

Coalitions in European Union Negotiations

Coalitions will probably become an increasingly important theme in European Union (EU) politics. The spread of decision making by majority voting promotes coalition‐building behaviour. The impending enlargement is predicted to differentiate and polarize policy standpoints within the EU. Increasing levels of policy conflict imply increased propensities for coalition building. Still, the role and nature of coalitions in EU negotiations are obscure. This article raises important research questions: What characterizes coalition building in the EU? How important are coalitions? What coalition patterns are discernible?Using data from a questionnaire to Swedish participants on EU committees, it is shown that coalitions are more frequent when majority voting occurs than when unanimity rules. Coalition behaviour is, however, important also under unanimity. The existence of consensus norms diminishes the propensity to form coalitions. As regards coalition patterns, there is a prevalence of coalitions based on policy interests and/or on cultural affinity. Contrary to conventional wisdom, consistent and durable coalition patterns seem to exist. The north–south divide is one such persistent pattern. The Swedish respondents thus reveal a close cooperation between the Nordic member states and Great Britain, whereas France and Spain are seldom approached for coalition‐building purposes. As to future research, evidence from other member states and from case studies is needed in order to learn more about the bases for coalition building in EU negotiations.     

Democracy and mediation in territorial civil wars in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific

The awarding of the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize to former President Martti Ahtisaari, Finland, cites his involvement in the settlement of the Aceh conflict. This at the same time highlights the lack of such efforts in the regions of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. While internal conflicts throughout the world often tend to be resilient to conflict management initiatives, conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region have proven to be particularly difficult to resolve. Internal conflicts in Southeast Asia and the Pacific often concern territorial issue, for instance, East Timor and ethnically based conflicts in Myanmar. This is also true for conflicts in the South Pacific, notably in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) and New Caledonia (France). Territorial conflicts last longer, are more difficult to manage, and generally produce more adverse consequences than those over other issues such as ideology, government, and national power. Further, conflicts in this region appear to be of low priority for third parties, with comparatively few interventions from third parties. The strong central governments seem to be a factor in preventing mediation-based solution to such conflicts. Nevertheless, there are reasons to be optimistic. Third party mediation, democratization, and the recent success in Aceh provide promise for the future, and the recent Nobel Prize confirms this.     

Das Bundesverfassungsgericht im politischen System der BRD – ein unbekanntes Wesen?

This article argues that the Judicialization hypothesis as a dominant research paradigm in the literature on the Bundesverfassungsgericht leaves out a number of relevant aspects. Rather, the court should be understood as being embedded in an area of competing interests among government, opposition, courts, litigating citizens and public opinion. The article identifies the institutional links between actors and relevant research questions. Finally, it discusses the theoretical, methodological and empirical challenges for further research on the Bundesverfassungsgericht.     

Political and public acceptability of congestion pricing: Ideology and self‐interest

Studies of the “stated preferences” of households generally report public and political opposition by urban commuters to congestion pricing. It is thought that this opposition inhibits or precludes tolls and pricing systems that would enhance efficiency in the use of scarce roadways. This paper analyzes the only case in which road pricing was decided by a citizen referendum on the basis of experience with a specific pricing system. The city of Stockholm introduced a toll system for seven months in 2006, after which citizens voted on its permanent adoption. We match precinct voting records to resident commute times and costs by traffic zone, and we analyze patterns of voting in response to economic and political incentives. We document political and ideological incentives for citizen choice, but we also find that the pattern of time savings and incremental costs exerts a powerful influence on voting behavior. In this instance, at least, citizen voters behave as if they value commute time highly. When they have experienced first‐hand the out‐of‐pocket costs and time savings of a specific pricing scheme, they are prepared to adopt freely policies that reduce congestion on urban motorways. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.