Managing contract performance: A transaction costs approach

Managing contracts is a complex process, often exacerbated by high transaction costs inherent in negotiating, implementing, and monitoring contract relationships with vendors. Through analyses of data from a 1997 International City/County Management Association survey of municipal and county governments, the way in which municipal and county governments respond to transaction cost factors inherent in contract service delivery is examined. The results of the analyses demonstrate that when governments contract for services in contexts that risk contract failure, they engage in a variety of monitoring techniques to improve their ability to monitor and correct vendor performance. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Early Life Socioeconomic Disparities in Children’s Sleep: The Mediating Role of the Current Home Environment

Journal of Youth and Adolescence - Despite identified concurrent socioeconomic disparities in children’s sleep, little research has examined pathways explaining such associations. This study...     

Aurelian Craiutu, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Faces of Moderation: The Art of Balance in an Age of Extremes</Emphasis>

Review of Aurelian Craiutu’s work, Faces of Moderation: The Art of Balance in an Age of Extremes (2017).     

Authoritarian Abdication: Bargaining Power and the Role of Firms in Migrant Welfare

Throughout the Arabian Gulf, the immigration law known as the kafala formally delegates to firms and other “sponsors” control over migrants’ mobility, housing, and general welfare. These states have abdicated almost any responsibility over migrants, giving firms nearly unchecked power over their workers’ daily lives. In this paper, I consider the welfare implications of this system and explore the conditions under which migrants can extract concessions from firms. Drawing on a nationally representative survey from Qatar, I show that migrant satisfaction, workplace difficulties, and overall quality of life varies widely across camps and firms. In explaining this variation, I argue that welfare crucially depends on an individual’s bargaining power. Migrants with a contract or credible exit options hold greater bargaining power, which strongly associates with improved perceptions of welfare. All told, contracts and exit options appear to provide even the most vulnerable workers a means of protection within authoritarian states.     

Coercion versus Choice: Citizen Evaluations of Public Service Quality across Methods of Consumption

Treating all respondents to citizen satisfaction surveys as "customers" risks misinterpreting the findings and misguiding managerial decision making. Citizen evaluations of the quality of public services are likely to vary based on whether citizens have a direct or indirect relationship to the service. Furthermore, citizens are likely to rate services differently based on whether they consume the services as a result of coercion or choice, although the quality of the interaction shapes the impact of the type of interaction. Based on a series of empirical analyses, this paper demonstrates that recipients who have superior-quality interactions with providers are likely to report high ratings for elective services, whereas citizens who have poor-quality interactions are likely to report low ratings for coercive services. In this way, the quality of the interaction influences citizens' predispositions to rate services high or low based on whether they consume the service by choice or coercion.