Public or private health services? A Skeptic's view

For many years economists writing on the delivery of health services dusted off the traditional promarket analyses of textbooks and applied them uncritically to the health care industry. Specialists in health care today are far more cautious. From the medical side there has been an increasing interest in the economic implications of health care organization and medical practice. Good research drawing on the skills of economists and other specialists is rapidly growing. This research offers little support either to those who reason abstractly from a market ideology or to those who are uncritically committed to socialized health care.     

Le contrôle de l'information gouvernementale: le cas du Québec

Sommaire: Nos sociétés modernes font l'objet de débats très controversés autour du problème de I'accès à l'information gouvernementale. Une approche systémique permet entre aittres de prendre conscience des différents enjeux inhérents au contrôle de cette information. Elle expliqrie pourquoi certains Etats sont plus en-clins que d'autres à favoriser 1'accès à l'information gouvernementale. Dans cette approche, la société est perçue comme un système d'acteurs dont les trois principaux sont le gouvernement, les intermediaires et les différents publics, avec en plus les acteurs externes dans I'environnement. Ces acteurs sont soumis à des règles normatives ou pragniatiques. Leur pouvoir respectif de contrôle est loin d'être équivalent. Le pouvoir du gouvrnement sur les différentes dimensions de la communication le démarque fortement de ses compétiteurs. Certaines propriétés générales dri système, de caractère- plus macroscopique, sont ensuite dégagées, soit la tendance gÆné rale à l'amplification de I'information gouvernementale ainsi que la tendance a l'amplification des prohlémes contradictoires reliés au trop grand secret de l'information gouvernementale d'une part, et à la trop petite protection de l'information personnelle d'autre part. Le gouvernement québécois a maintenant legiféré dans ce domaine. mais la loi d'accès ne inodifie pas fondanientalement les propriétés generales du systeme ni le pouvoir prédominant du gouvernement sur les autres acteurs politiques. Abstract: In modern societies, the problem of access to government information has been the subject of passionate debates. The systemic approach offers, among other things, an awareness of the various stakes inherent in the control of this information. It explains why some countries are more favourably disposed toward easy access to government information. In this approach, society is perceived as a players' system, the three main actors being the government, the intermediaries and the public, with, in addition, outside actors. The actors are subjected to normative or pragmatic rules but their respective control is far from being of equal value. Through its power on the various dimensions of communications, the government is very much set apart from its competitors. Some general and more macroscopic characteristics of the system are then oAPred: on the one hand, the general tendency to exaggerate government information as well as the tendency to overstate the contradictory problems.     

DOING GOOD WELL: The Use of Quantitative Social Science Data in Advocacy Proceedings

When social scientists participate in advocacy proceedings as expert witnesses, they find themselves subjected to pressures beyond those of scientific quality. This paper considers a range of problems when the demands of scientific merit interact with the exigencies of vigorous advocacy and suggests some rough guidelines for expert testimony.     

POLICY PREFERENCES OF JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS

Focusing on the issue of civil rights, this study examines the relationship between policy preferences of presidents and the votes of the Supreme Court justices they appointed. Through content analysis of presidential statements, relatively systematic measures of civil rights policy views for five recent presidents were obtained and compared with the voting records on civil rights of justices they appointed to the Supreme Court. The findings suggest that although a correspondence exists between presidential preferences and judicial votes, presidents have been only moderately successful in appointing justices whose votes reflect presidential preferences.