Relationship between blood and urine alcohol concentrations in apprehended drivers who claimed consumption of alcohol after driving with and without supporting evidence

For various reasons, many people suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA) are not apprehended sitting behind the wheel, but some time after the driving. This gives them the opportunity to claim they drank alcohol after the time of driving or after they were involved in a road-traffic crash. Alleged post-offence drinking is not easy for the prosecution to disprove, which often means that the DUIA charge is dropped or the person is acquitted if the case goes to trial. The routine practice of sampling and measuring the concentration of alcohol in blood (BAC) and urine (UAC) and calculating urine/blood ratios (UAC/BAC) and the changes in UAC between two successive voids furnishes useful information to support or challenge alleged drinking after driving. We present here a retrospective case series of DUIA offenders (N = 40) in half of which there was supporting evidence of an after-drink (eye witness or police reports) and in the other half no such evidence existed apart from the suspect's admission. When there was supporting evidence of an after-drink, the UAC/BAC ratio for the first void was close to or less than unity (mean 1.04, median 1.08, range 0.54–1.21) and the UAC increased by 0.21 g/L (range 0.02–0.57) between the two voids. Without any supporting evidence of post-offence drinking the mean UAC/BAC ratio was 1.46 (range 1.35–1.93) for the first void, verifying that absorption and distribution of alcohol in all body fluids and tissues was complete. In these cases, the UAC between successive voids decreased by 0.25 g/L on average (range 0.10–0.49), indicating the post-absorptive phase of the BAC curve. Long experience from investigating claims of post-offence drinking leads us to conclude that in the vast majority of cases this lacks any substance and is simply a last resort by DUIA offenders to evade justice. Unless supporting evidence exists (eye witness, police reports, etc.) of post-offence drinking the courts are encouraged to ignore this defence argument.     

Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development of Civil Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions

This article follows two earlier pieces in which the author reported the findings of a pilot empirical exploration of how well the discovery system in civil litigation is functioning. Brazil begins by focusing on the principal problems his field studies exposed and by suggesting a theory of discovery reform which responds to the nature and sources of those problems. His principal thesis is that too often neither judges nor attorneys assume sufficient responsibility for the discovery system as a system. Most of this article is devoted to two major proposals that are designed to promote in the judiciary and in counsel a sense of responsibility for the pretrial system and to equip the judiciary to convert that sense into action. Brazil proposes a comprehensive model rule that courts could use to manage the pretrial development of civil actions. He then uses his model as a background for suggesting modifications to and extensions of the proposed revision of Rule 16 that the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has circulated for comment. He also offers a critique of current provisions for sanctions and advances an alternative sanctions rule that acknowledges a right to compensation for damages caused by an opponent's breach of pretrial obligations and that reduces the scope of judicial discretion to refuse to impose compensatory awards.     

THE DETERMINATION OF ANTITRUST LIABILITY IN UNITED STATES v. MICROSOFT: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE USED TO PROVE ITS CASE

This paper considers the empirical evidence used by the Departmentof Justice in the U.S. v. Microsoft antitrust case to provethat Microsoft engaged in exclusionary (and anticompetitive)actions in the browser market as part of its efforts to maintainits dominance of the personal computer operating system market.This evidence deserves special consideration because the DistrictCourt made the unusual decision to rely on the empirical evidencepresented by the Department of Justice rather than the empiricalevidence presented by Microsoft. This decision was unusual becauseMicrosoft's evidence had a strong presumption of validity asit was based on data that Microsoft collected and used in theordinary course of its business. Furthermore, no market participantsused the Department of Justice-sponsored data in any meaningfulway. Although it is impossible to determine with any certaintywhy the District Court ruled the way it did, I conclude thatthere were two driving forces in the court's decision. The Departmentof Justice identified serious flaws in Microsoft's data, makingit unreliable for the purposes for which Microsoft was usingit in the trial. The Department of Justice was also able toshow that no such flaws affected the data it sponsored and indeed,on many points, that data was more consistent with the testimonyof Microsoft executives than the data sponsored by Microsoft.     

Governance in Central Asia: national in form,Soviet in content

American policy toward Central Asia is based on a serious misperception of the region's problems and potential for non‐violent political change. The reality is that the five Central Asian states are not post‐Soviet but neo‐Soviet. The former Communist Party bosses retain the nomenklatura system of centralised and hierarchical rule. The regimes also resemble the clan‐based autocracies of post‐colonial Africa, but with the mechanisms of the modern police state. These countries face all the challenges common to the Third World, but are less amenable to positive external influences or to the development of pluralist politics and civil society. While the regimes have mixed prospects for retaining power, none is likely to succeed in economic development or in responding to social change.