Socio-Cultural Differences and International Competition Law

The purpose of this study is to explore socio-cultural divergence¹ among contracting parties, members and potential candidates that could favour or complicate the establishment of an effective² set of common competition rules at World Trade Organisation (WTO) level. Therefore, the focus is on historical, religious, ideological and systemic differences in relation to competition rules that might otherwise be overlooked during the negotiations, but later prove crucial or even detrimental to the actual implementation of thus only formally common international rules.     

Editorial

Ohne Zusammenfassung

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Editorial

     

Die Ordnungsidee kooperativer Gemeinwohlkonkreitsierung

Ohne Zusammenfassung Besprechungsessay zu Gunnar Folke Schuppert: Verwaltungswissenschaft. Verwaltung, Verwaltungsrecht, Verwaltungslehre. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2000, 1023 S., DM 187,-/95,61 Euro.     

Issue transfer and symbolic legislation: a case study of the Austrian Equal Treatment Act

Abstract. Three strategies which may emerge out of politicians' concepts of rationality (problems solving, agenda management, creation of consensus) are applied to one of the main features of Austrian politics, namely the differentation of policy sectors dominated either by political parties or interest groups. The Equal Treatment Act, which had been transferred from the corporatist arena to the arena of the party system, involved the rationalities of both political parties and interest groups. This paper analyses the 'extended' process of legislation of this law (including implementation). The empirical findings are then linked to the theoretical propositions about the rationalities of the respective political actors. Finally, hypotheses about the conditions of issue transfers from the corporatist arena into the arena of the party system are suggested.     

Financing German Unity: Fiscal Conflict Resolution in a Complex Federation

Unification posed a new challenge to the Federal Republic ofGermany. Two economically different areas were united into onefederal polity. Due to the constitutional command to safeguardequivalency of living conditions throughout the republic, thefederal government as well as the "old" Länder were supposedto support the "new" Länder of East Germany. Until 1994,provisional regulations served to finance East Germany; in 1995,the new Länder were integrated on an equal footing intothe "financial constitution" of the Basic Law. Unification wasnot used for constitutional reform as had been demanded by someLand leaders. Concerning intergovernmental fiscal relations,one can speak of "budgetary adaptation" only. It was not possibleto resolve long-lasting constitutional issues together withthe challenge of unification. German unification has been, andwill be, very costly. Public debt rose from roughly 900 billionGerman marks in 1989 to more than two trillion in 1995. Theargument about burden sharing between the federation and the"old" Länder continues, and the formulas of fiscal equalizationhave been challenges by Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg.     

Evolutionarily stable preferences in contests

We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that the indirect evolutionary approach yields the same more aggressive behavior, too. This holds for any population size N, if the evolution of preferences is determined by behavior in two-player contests. The evolutionarily stable preferences (ESP) of the indirect approach turn out to be negatively interdependent, thereby “rationalizing” the more aggressive behavior.     

德国医疗卫生改革：行为体、利益与立法过程分析——以《加强法定医保竞争法》（2007）为例

2007年3月德国《加强法定医保竞争法》（GKV-WSG）出台。本文分析了该法出台前后德国医疗卫生改革所带来的新的行为体格局以及2009年1月1日起生效的改革内容。笔者认为,《加强法定医保竞争法》在多个方面承袭了“渐变”的发展模式,但同时该法也带来了德国医疗卫生体制的深刻变革,尤其在行为体格局方面。因此本文主要探讨实验治理的新形式、对立的利益格局、艰难的谈判进程以及倾向于否决的行为体结构。     

IMF conditionality: An approach based on the theory of special interest politics

Financial assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs) aims to help member countries reduce their economic policy distortions. Because these distortions are endogenously generated, it is important to understand how IFI assistance interacts with the domestic political economy. In this paper, we review recent models of IFI conditional assistance that are based on the theory of special interest politics (Grossman and Helpman 2001). In these models, governments adopt inefficient economic policies and instruments because of lobbying by interest groups. IFI assistance helps reduce these inefficiencies, at least under perfect and symmetric information, and provided IFIs are representative of the general public in creditor and debtor countries. Factors limiting the effectiveness of conditional assistance as an incentive system are also identified. These are related to information asymmetries, the potential for political instability in debtor countries, and the IFIs’ own financial solvency.