Retribution or Truth-Telling in South Africa? Legacies of the Transitional Phase

Almost from the start of South Africa's transition to democracy in the 1990s, the issue arose of how those both within the National Party government and from the opposition who had committed human rights abuses would be treated. Like many other countries undergoing democratic regime change, South Africa's endeavors to exorcise the demons of its past while ensuring stability have depended and continue to depend to a certain extent on the delicate choice between truth telling and retribution, a choice, in turn, closely tied to the process of democratization and to the distibution of power within the body that led the change. The authors ask how the nature of the South African transition and the character of the transitional authority affected the treatment of past abuses. They further examine the way the transitional authorities balanced retribution and truth telling and the consequences of their actions for the stability of the new democracy.     

The Impact of Russian Terrorism in Kishinev on the Zionist Movement and the Jewish Intelligentsia

The explosion of terror which took place in the Bessarabian capital in April 1903 and which has since become known as the Kishinev Pogrom had a profound impact on all of Russian Jewry. But as far as the Zionist movement is concerned, and in opposition to what is generally believed about the Pogrom's central role in the history of Zionism, the Pogrom did not lead to any changes in the activities undertaken by the Zionists or in the ideology which they espoused. It was rather that the Pogrom triggered certain phenomena already present in Zionism during the preceding few years.     

Low Power,First Offers,and Reservation Prices: Weak Negotiators are Self-anchored by Their Own Alternatives

Although most scholars recommend making the first offer in negotiations, recent research and practitioners' experience have uncovered a second-mover advantage in certain situations. In the current article, we explore this first- versus second-mover dynamic by investigating the circumstances under which negotiators would make less favorable first offers than they would receive were they to move second, focusing on the effects of negotiation power in the form of alternatives. Additionally, we examine the effects of low power on reservation prices and whether these effects could be mitigated using an anchor-debiasing technique. In Study 1, we manipulated negotiators' power in the form of the best alternative to the negotiated agreement and examined its effect on first offers and reservation prices. Our results showed that low-power negotiators would receive more favorable first offers than they would have made themselves when facing either low- or medium-power counterparts. Also, our results suggest that low-power negotiators had less favorable reservation prices than their medium- and high- power counterparts. In Study 2, we investigated whether this effect would persist in the face of anchor-debiasing techniques. Our results showed that while anchor-debiasing techniques did improve their first offers, low-power negotiators would still benefit from making the counteroffer rather than moving first. Our findings uncover the disadvantageous effects of low power on first-offer magnitude while offering practical advice to negotiators.