印度早期共产主义运动

一印度人同国际共产主义运动取得联系以及印度共产党在国外的建立,经历了一段漫长而令人困惑的历史。在第一次世界大战爆发期间,一些富有斗争精神的民族主义者已认识到不时发生的恐怖主义既天真又无用,感到只有依靠外国的援助才能产生有组织的民族革命运动并取得国家的独立。这一令人向往的前景召唤了一代勇敢的青年人去进行革     

项松茂:舍身成仁的皂药双料大王

盘点中国民族工商阶级发展史,那一个个"火柴大王""面粉大王""纺织大王"的名字如同璀璨星空里的明星一样熠熠生辉.当他们离开这个繁华世界时,却都无法逃过自然规律的命运. 集旧上海"西药大王""肥皂大王"于一身的项松茂先生却是一个极大的例外——因抗战军兴,项松茂组织义勇军抗击日寇,最后竟惨遭杀害.甚至,时至今日,他的尸骨依...     

The net effects of the Project NetWork return-to-work case management experiment on participant earnings, benefit receipt, and other outcomes

The Social Security Administration (SSA) initiated Project NetWork in 1991 to test case management as a means of promoting employment among persons with disabilities. The demonstration, which targeted Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) applicants and recipients, offered intensive outreach, work-incentive waivers, and case management/referral services. Participation in Project NetWork was voluntary. Volunteers were randomly assigned to the "treatment" group or the "control" group. Those assigned to the treatment group met individually with a case or referral manager who arranged for rehabilitation and employment services, helped clients develop an individual employment plan, and provided direct employment counseling services. Volunteers assigned to the control group could not receive services from Project NetWork but remained eligible for any employment assistance already available in their communities. For both treatment and control groups, the demonstration waived specific DI and SSI program rules considered to be work disincentives. The experimental impact study thus measures the incremental effects of case and referral management services. The eight demonstration sites were successful in implementing the experimental design roughly as planned. Project NetWork staff were able to recruit large numbers of participants and to provide rehabilitation and employment services on a substantial scale. Most of the sites easily reached their enrollment targets and were able to attract volunteers with demographic characteristics similar to those of the entire SSI and DI caseload and a broad range of moderate and severe disabilities. However, by many measures, volunteers were generally more "work-ready" than project eligible in the demonstration areas who did not volunteer to receive NetWork services. Project NetWork case management increased average annual earnings by $220 per year over the first 2 years following random assignment. This statistically significant impact, an approximate 11-percent increase in earnings, is based on administrative data on earnings. For about 70 percent of sample members, a third year of followup data was available. For this limited sample, the estimated effect of Project NetWork on annual earnings declined to roughly zero in the third followup year. The findings suggest that the increase in earnings may have been short-lived and may have disappeared by the time Project NetWork services ended. Project NetWork did not reduce reliance on SSI or DI benefits by statistically significant amounts over the 30-42 month followup period. The services provided by Project NetWork thus did not reduce overall SSI and DI caseloads or benefits by substantial amounts, especially given that only about 5 percent of the eligible caseload volunteered to participate in Project NetWork. Project NetWork produced modest net benefits to persons with disabilities and net costs to taxpayers. Persons with disabilities gained mainly because the increases in their earnings easily outweighed the small (if any) reduction in average SSI and DI benefits. For SSA and the federal government as a whole, the costs of Project NetWork were not sufficiently offset by increases in tax receipts resulting from increased earnings or reductions in average SSI and DI benefits. The modest net benefits of Project NetWork to persons with disabilities are encouraging. How such benefits of an experimental intervention should be weighed against costs of taxpayers depends on value judgments of policymakers. Because different case management projects involve different kinds of services, these results cannot be directly generalized to other case management interventions. They are nevertheless instructive for planning new initiatives. Combining case and referral management services with various other interventions, such as longer term financial support for work or altered provider incentives, could produc     

Attrition in the new beneficiary survey and followup, and its correlates

Panel surveys interview the same individuals more than once over a period of time. Attrition from the survey occurs when those individuals die, refuse to be interviewed again, or, for some other reason, cannot be contacted. If the original sample was representative of a specific population, then survey analysis may provide misleading conclusions about changes in population characteristics over time if these individuals leave the sample in a nonrandom way. Therefore, it is important to identify the characteristics of individuals who leave the survey for various reasons. This article explores the extent of and reasons for attrition in the New Beneficiary Survey (NBS) between the first interview in 1982 and the followup interview in 1991. Presented is a comparison of the characteristics of survivors (the reinterviewed sample) with attriters (those in the sample not reinterviewed) from the retired-worker and disabled-worker samples. The article explores a variety of potential determinants of attrition to the probability of attrition. These determinants are examined alone and in a multivariate framework. The NBS sample population is drawn from and linked to Social Security Administrative records, which have exact matched data on mortality as a cause of attrition. These data do not depend on survey-reported reasons for attrition; hence, it allows the examination of the differences in the patterns and predictors of attrition due to death and due to other reasons, primarily, the refusal to be interviewed. Attrition due to death must be identified precisely because misidentification of death as refusal to be interviewed may lead researchers to infer more selective attrition than might be the case. Different patterns of attrition are evident in the comparison of attrition levels and the determinants of attrition for the retired and disabled samples, both composed of persons with relatively high mortality risk. In particular, individuals' health, health insurance coverage, and level of education have different impacts on their likelihood of attrition. In general, it appears that refusal to be interviewed is more evenly spread across populations and characteristics than is death. The analysis shows that attrition due to death and attrition due to refusal are quite different processes, even though health conditions play a role in both processes. The results suggest that because attrition patterns (including death) may be quite different across population samples, sample-specific attrition patterns must be analyzed over the lifetime of any panel study. Long-term studies of panel attrition are necessary to provide researchers analyzing the data with information on potential biases due to nonrandom attrition.