Conceptualizing Semi‐Legality in Migration Research

What is semi‐legality, and why does it offer a viable alternative to the legality–illegality binary divide? Semi‐legality, as a heuristic device, is useful to frame the various “in‐between” statuses and not resorting to illegality every time ambiguities arise as this casts the net of potential fraud far too wide. It could be viewed as a multidimensional space where migrants' formal relationships with the state interact with their various forms of agency toward the law. As a sensitizing theoretical perspective, it helps to explain why many neoliberal regimes, which claim that law and order are the main features distinguishing them from others, actually engage in perpetuating the legally ambiguous modes of incorporation. Delineating the conditions of semi‐legality, I use data from 360 qualitative interviews with migrants in four European countries. I discuss: (1) “incomplete” responses to regularization programs (amnesties) – de facto fulfilling the legalization conditions, yet facing barriers to formally (de jure) corroborate this; (2) balancing between the temporality of residence in various EU countries—under‐staying in some and overstaying in others; and (3) the nexus with employment—where migrants' residence in a country is lawful, but their work exceeds the restrictions permitted by their visas.     

Entry Bar as Surreptitious Deportation? Zapret na v'ezd in Russian Immigration Law and Practice: A Comparative Perspective

Since 2013, a three‐year entry bar (zapret na v'ezd) has been issued in Russia to migrants with a record of two or more administrative offenses. This article examines the sociolegal characteristics of zapret na v'ezd by situating it in a global, comparative perspective, vis‐à‐vis the legal developments in the areas of deportation and removal in the United States and the United Kingdom. This article argues that the Russian entry bar law experienced a shift, established by other migration‐receiving jurisdictions, from controlling the migration process to controlling the social conduct of migrants, toward an increased reliance on deportability as a form of post‐entry control of the migrant population. At a broader level, I aim to shed more light on the migration governance processes in Russia—the third largest destination of migrants worldwide—by moving away from the intellectually dead‐end explanations that consider Russia as a deviant exception.     

Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study

We experimentally study the common wisdom that money buys political influence. In the game, one special interest (i.e., a corporate firm) has the opportunity to influence redistributive tax policies in her favor by transferring money to two competing candidates. The success of the investment depends on whether or not the candidates are willing and able to collude on low‐tax policies that do not harm their relative chances in the elections. In the experiment, successful political influence never materializes when the firm and candidates interact just once. By contrast, it yields substantially lower redistribution in about 40% of societies with finitely repeated encounters. However, investments are not always profitable, and profit sharing between the firm and candidates depends on prominent equity norms. Our experimental results shed new light on the complex process of buying political influence in everyday politics and help explain why only relatively few firms do actually attempt to influence policymaking.     

Poland

European Journal of Political Research -     

Direct presidential elections: a world summary

This paper first examines the frequency of direct presidential elections among the 170 countries of the world with a working, directly elected parliament. We find that there is a directly elected president in more than half of the countries and in about two-thirds of the republics. Former British colonies are less likely to hold direct presidential elections, which are otherwise very popular in North and South America and Africa. We then examine the kind of electoral formula that is used for the election of presidents. Most elections are held under the majority rule, most of the time under the majority runoff procedure. The majority rule is clearly predominant in Europe and Africa, and is unpopular in North America. Finally, no relationship is observed between the level of economic development or of democracy and the use of direct presidential elections or the choice of an electoral formula.