Share the Wealth: Redistribution Can Increase Economic Efficiency

People frequently face uncertain income and the threat of loss can inhibit economic investments. Government redistribution can insure citizens against economic losses, but its effect on people’s investment decisions depends on how they react to redistributive rules. We apply methods from experimental economics to study how a redistributive institution affects people’s investment decisions. Experiment 1 tests whether redistribution can increase economic efficiency when people face risk problems—investment opportunities that are profitable on average but could result in a loss. In a between-subject design, participants decide whether to make a risky investment either individually or under an institution that redistributes earnings equally among four group members. We find greater investment and profits when participants are required to share their earnings. In Experiment 2, we examine free-riding by comparing an institution that allows non-investors to exploit investors to an assortment institution that matches investors with investors. We find that vulnerability to free-riding suppresses investment, whereas an assortment mechanism increases investment by preventing free-riding and thereby facilitating risk pooling.     

Ophthalmologic Concerns in Abusive Head Trauma

When Abusive Head Trauma (AHT) is suspected in a child, a dilated eye examination by an ophthalmologist is an essential part of the medical workup, as the presence and pattern of retinal hemorrhages can have a high positive predictive rate for abusive head injury. This article proposes to review the clinical presentation, pathophysiology, natural history, sequelae, and differential diagnosis of retinal hemorrhages and other ocular lesions associated with AHT.     

Transaction costs can encourage Coasean bargaining

When there are three parties, instability problems brought about by the emptiness of the core of the corresponding cooperative game may cause the Coase Theorem to fail, even when other more direct impediments to bargaining are low. We show that the standard Coasean bargaining game involving three parties is strategically equivalent to an asymmetric three-player majority game. Hence, when there are three parties, instability problems will cause the Coase Theorem to fail if and only if the core of the corresponding three-player majority game is empty. We use this equivalence result to derive all instances in which the Coase Theorem will and will not hold with three parties, and show that a priori, such instability problems are likely to be rare—the Coase Theorem will actually hold most (over 80 %) of the time. We also demonstrate that it is always possible to find a set of transaction costs which, when introduced into a frictionless bargaining situation, will cause an empty core to become non-empty. In other words, transaction costs can mitigate instability problems: situations exist in which the presence of transaction costs will cause the Coase Theorem to hold when, in the absence of those direct transaction costs, it would fail to hold. When there are three parties, rather than hindering agreements, the existence of direct transaction costs can sometimes—but not always—reduce instability and encourage Coasean bargaining.     

Book reviews

Ephraim Maisel, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1991–1926 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press 1994), £35. ISBN 1–898723–04–4.

Timothy P. Maga, The World of Jimmy Carter: U.S. Foreign Policy 1977–1981 (West Haven, CT: University of New Haven Press, 1994). 189 pp. ISBN 0–936385–23–0.

Michael Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South‐East Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), xii + 271pp. £45. ISBN 0–415–04219–4.

Christopher C. Harmon and David Tucker (eds.), Statecraft and Power: Essays in Honor of Harold W. Rood (Lanham and London: University Press of America with the National Institute for Public Policy, 1994), 284pp ISBN 0–8191–8718–6.     

Preface

ABSTRACT

Although first explicitly coined in Renaissance Italy, the notion of a ‘balance of power’ – the conduct of state actors to meet the logics of power balancing – goes back to pre-modern times. Traditionally, scholars have looked to the Punic Wars and the early modern period as early evidence for the balance. However, the ancient Near East during the second-millennium BC has received far less attention. Yet Western Asia existed as an international arena of states fully integrated in a system based on interdependence and power balancing. In the field of International Relations, systematic analyses of this phase in world history remain under-developed. Accordingly, the question of when a systemic environment for the balancing behaviour existed for the first time has been addressed less in International Relations theory where the literature leans primarily on the European experience.     

Does resting heart rate at age 18 distinguish general and violent offending up to age 50? Findings from the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development

Purpose

There is a sizable literature documenting the relationship between resting heart rate and antisocial behavior in children and adolescents. Absent from the literature is the extent to which heart rate has long-term prediction into late middle adulthood and the extent to which such effects are specific to certain crime types, such as violence, or whether heart rate effects are more general.

Methods

This study uses data from the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development, a longitudinal study of 411 South London males followed through age 50 in order to examine these two research questions.

Results

Results suggest that lower heart rates are significantly associated with total conviction frequency and involvement in violence. This pattern of relationships is not altered by the inclusion of additional risk factors such as early childhood risk factors, adolescent involvement in smoking, body mass index, participation in team sports, binge drinking, or a measure of impulsivity.

Conclusions

Heart rate was found to be a significant correlate of criminal offending. Study limitations and implications are discussed.     

The relationship between schemas and offence supportive attitudes in mentally disordered sexual offenders

Abstract

The study of schemas in sexual offenders is a relatively new approach in attempts to understand the deviant beliefs and attitudes of sexual offenders. Emerging findings suggest that offence supportive attitudes may be the product of an offender's underlying schemas. This study aims to establish the relationship between offence supportive attitudes and schemas in a sample of mentally disordered sexual offenders (MDSOs). Thirty-one male sexual offenders held within low through high security forensic mental health units were assessed using the Young Schema Questionnaire - Short Version 3 and the Questionnaire on Attitudes Consistent with Sex Offending. Correlational analyses suggested a pattern of relationships in which Insufficient Self-control, Entitlement and Enmeshment arose as the schemas associated with most offence supportive attitudes. This supports a relationship between schemas and offence supportive attitudes in MDSOs and is consistent with the literature to date. Implications for further research and treatment are considered.