The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world

This paper empirically analyzes whether government size is conducive or detrimental to life satisfaction in a cross-section of 74 countries. We thus provide a test of the longstanding dispute between standard neoclassical economic theory and public choice theory. According to the neoclassical view, governments play unambiguously positive roles for individuals' quality of life, while the theory of public choice has been developed to understand why governments often choose excessive involvement in – and regulation of – the economy, thereby harming their citizens' quality of life. Our results show that life satisfaction decreases with higher government consumption. For low, middle income, and male people, this result is stronger when the government is leftwing, while government consumption appears to be less harmful for women when the government is perceived to be effective. Government capital formation and social spending have no significant impact on life satisfaction.     

Sustainable governance of natural resources and institutional change–an analytical framework

This article presents a conceptual framework for analysing the governance of natural resource use, as governance is often the primary issue when natural resources are overexploited and degraded. It addresses both spontaneous and active governance, including institutional change induced by development co‐operation. Drawing on existing frameworks of institutional analysis, fundamental modifications are presented to adapt the concept to the context of international co‐operation, and to include dynamic aspects of institutional change as well as multiple actor interactions. Tested in several case studies, the framework was found suitable and relevant for use in project planning and evaluation, as well as for comparing governance issues across cases in a conceptually rigorous way. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Swings and gerrymanders

It is usual for electoral analysts to calculate the swing necessary at the next election to unseat a government, assuming that the swing is a uniform one. However, swings are not uniform. The non-uniform swing which would, on average, unseat a government is shown to be different from the uniform swing. For example, at the next Australian election for the House of Representatives, a uniform swing of 1.5 per cent against the current government would cause it to lose five seats, leaving it in a minority of 73 out of 148 seats, but a non-uniform swing of only 0.8 per cent would, on average, have the same effect. Implications of this variability for the size of the majority, the possibilities of a Parliament with an even number of seats being equally-divided, and the use of this analysis to detect gerrymandering and to correct for it, are considered.     

The 1984 election as Anthony downs and Stanley Kelley might interpret it

This paper is an analysis of two rational choice theories of elections. Anthony Downs and Stanley Kelley's theories yield complementary interpretations of the 1984 U. S. election. Reagan's victory was based on both prospective and retrospective judgments as well as on candidate and policy considerations. Reagan won that element of an incumbent's reelection that is a referendum on his performance as president. However, people also voted on the basis of domestic and foreign policy preferences for the second term. On these issues voters preferred Mondale as much as Reagan. Reagan's victory owed remarkably little to his conservative agenda and to a warm regard for his personal qualities as a leader. His landslide was deceptive. The two Reagan victories were among the weakest of the six landslides of the postwar period by Kelley's test of decisiveness. The Reagan elections have not set the United States on the course of a long-term conservative agenda in either domestic or foreign affairs.     

Dillon's Rule Under the Burger Court: The Municipal Liability Cases

Under the Burger Court, the constitutional relationship betweenstates and their municipalities has been examined primarilyin cases involving private suits initiated against municipalitiesunder federal antitrust and civil rights statutes. Since theCourt's 1943 Parker v. Brown decision, it had been presumedthat municipalities as political subdivisions of states wereas immune as their states from tort liability under the ShermanAntitrust Act. The Burger Court, however, ruled that municipalitiesare not automatically immunized from tort liability simply becauseof their status as political subdivisions unless they can demonstratethat their actions were undertaken pursuant to an expressedstate policy. After 1980, the Court continued to uphold thevulnerability of municipalities to private suits authorizedby federal statutes, but moved to narrow the types of remedyappropriate under common law. The Burger Court did not, therefore,address the more fundamental question of whether municipalitiesas public actors should be liable to private damages in thecourse of their public functions.