Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War

Why the First World War ended in 1918 and not earlier remains a major puzzle. We propose a new theory that emphasizes how honor prolongs wars beyond what rationalist theories can explain. It argues that when honor is insulted, an affronted actor will strive to punish the offender. Absent an apology, the pursuit of a satisfactory punishment leads the affronted belligerent to ignore unfavorable battlefield information, hold logically irreconcilable beliefs, process information in emotional terms, and obsess over status. We predict that wars of prevention and territorial occupation are most likely to elicit honor considerations. We test our argument against an obscure episode in the war where Germany and the United States made peace overtures in December 1916. We demonstrate that honor concerns made Entente decision makers see German aggression as an affront to their honor that only the destruction of Germany's political regime could redress.     

Window of opportunity: Reflections on an idea fashionable in the west

The essay warns about the extreme danger of the fashionable idea that the West has only a marginal role to play in Russia's integration into the world community. It does not take into account the ferocious war of ideas in post‐Soviet Moscow which all but insures that nationalist ambition ‘to return Russia to the status of a leading global power’ would come out a winner. As a result of this the window of opportunity that opened after the disintegration of the Soviet empire may well slam shut again. The only way to prevent it seems to be for the West to create its own strategy of Russia's integration in which the dominant up to now theme of economic assistance (hardware) is replaced by the theme of intellectual participation (or the software of integration). That is why the purpose of the essay is to try to offer a logical set of criteria that could provide the basis for such an intelligent strategy.     

Conservatives Divided: Defending Rhodesia Against Malcolm Fraser 1976-1978

Understanding the conflict between pro- and anti-Rhodesian government parliamentarians is the only way to understand how and why Australia struggled to formulate a coherent Rhodesia policy. It reveals the extent to which Malcolm Fraser had to struggle against his own party in this matter and adds needed nuance to this period. Fraser's opinion that Rhodesia was a racist and immoral project caused a schism in the Coalition parties. Despite Fraser's open antipathy towards Rhodesia, Rhodesia's interests in Australia were largely safeguarded. This reflects the reality that the Liberal and National Country Parties contained sizeable blocs of parliamentarians who openly and publicly saw Rhodesia as a fraternal country, not a dangerous pariah. They did not hold these beliefs passively and actively sought to resist any moves made by Fraser to damage Rhodesia and its interests. By following the development of Fraser's Rhodesia policy in the late 1970s the power of Rhodesia's allies in the Australian parliament becomes clear. Opposing Rhodesia was touted by Fraser as one of the greatest achievements of his government, yet the issue was divisive and caused bitter infighting.     

The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards

We argue that partisan elected judges have an incentive to redistributewealth from out-of-state defendants (nonvoters) to in-stateplaintiffs (voters). We first test the hypothesis by using cross-statedata. We find a significant partisan effect after controllingfor differences in injuries, state incomes, poverty levels,selection effects, and other factors. One difference that appearsdifficult to control for is that each state has its own tortlaw. In cases involving citizens of different states, federaljudges decide disputes by using state law. Using these diversity-of-citizenshipcases, we conclude that differences in awards are caused bydifferences in electoral systems, not by differences in statelaw.