Maynard Keynes and the 'Bamboozlement' of Woodrow Wilson: What Really Happened at Paris? (Wilson, Lloyd George, pensions and pre-armistice agreement)

Woodrow Wilson's acceptance of Lloyd George's demand for the inclusion of military pensions among the reparations payable to the Allies under the Treaty of Versailles was stigmatized by J.M. Keynes in The Economic Consequences of the Peace as the most notorious of the President's alleged breaches of faith with Germany. Keynes's damning verdict remains virtually unquestioned. This paper reconsiders the case for pensions, suggests that the question was less clear-cut than Keynes insisted, and queries his influential account of Wilson's supposed gullibility and culpability. The paper then considers Lloyd George's intentions in the Pre-armistice agreement, from which the Allied right to reparations and pensions were derived.     

Ethics and entrapment: Understanding counterterrorism stings

ABSTRACT

This article examines domestic counterterrorism sting operations in the USA. It considers why critics consider these operations unethical and illegitimate. In particular, it looks at claims that counterterrorism sting operations have entrapped innocent people. This article explains why the U.S. courts have rejected claims of entrapment. It discusses different standards of entrapment used by the U.S. courts and sets out how these standards apply to counterterrorism sting operations. The article will show how key pieces of evidence convinced the courts that the targets of sting operations were predisposed towards terrorism. As a result, defendants were not able to mount successful entrapment defenses. By the end of the article, the reader will have a better understanding of the ethical and legal safeguards governing counterterrorism sting operations in the USA.     

Budget Reform in Malaysia and Australia Compared

The study, using the recent contrasting experience of budget reform in Malaysia and Australia, inquires why quite similar changes were attempted in different socio-economic and fiscal settings. It explains why their implementation differed and identifies the factors that shaped, sustained, or impeded the respective efforts.
Three basic themes emerge. First, political and administrative will are necessary requirements for the success of any budget reform effort. Second, the more correspondent the bureaucratic culture is with the culture upon which the new budget system is premised, the more easily change occurs. Third, a model of reform predicated upon the assumption of fiscal restraint cannot effectively function in a climate of fiscal relaxation. Malaysia adapted its budget model from the Australian system. As the Australian model suited the paradigm of expenditure restraint, the adapted model proved less workable against the Malaysian climate of fiscal relaxation.     

Lord Cunliffe, Lloyd George, reparations and reputations at the Paris peace conference, 1919

This paper reexamines the role of Lord Cunliffe, traditionally cast (by Lloyd George, among others) as one of the villains of the Paris Peace Conference for his extremism on reparations. It argues that Lloyd George used Cunliffe as a stalking-horse to conceal his own intention of exacting maximum reparations in the face of American opposition. Lloyd George's refusal to agree a final sum, despite the pleas of almost all his senior colleagues, reflected both Cunliffe's advice and his own fears of underestimating Germany's capacity by setting too low a figure, which would be largely consumed by French claims.     

The 'New Terrorism': Revolution or Evolution?

It is essential to understand the concept of the 'new terrorism', since it has fostered a paradigm shift in the way that academics, policy makers and counter-terrorism professionals conceive of the contemporary threat. Capturing the notion that there has been a revolutionary change in the nature of terrorism, it now plays a pre-eminent role in shaping counter-terrorism policy. However, despite the attractive simplicity of the concept, there are good reasons to question the assumption that the actual behaviour of terrorist groups has fundamentally altered. Indeed, an analysis of the history of terrorism shows that many of the supposed hallmarks of the 'new terrorism' have been seen in the past. As a consequence, the concept of the 'new terrorism' should be viewed with some scepticism, as it unduly exaggerates the unprecedented nature of the contemporary terrorist threat and needlessly leads policy makers to reject the relevance of historical counter-terrorism lessons.