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Leslie S. Lebl Author Vitae 《Orbis》2006,50(1):117-132
The past year saw growing uncertainty about the future of the European Union. Whether it becomes weaker or stronger, and whether it acts as a global partner or competitor, the United States cannot afford to ignore the eu. By understanding the different eu decision-making processes for defense, foreign policy, counterterrorism, and economic issues, the United States can do a better job of advancing its interests in Europe. 相似文献
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Jakub Grygiel Author Vitae 《Orbis》2006,50(2):209-221
The United States has had, and will continue to have, a difficult time gathering allies because of the supremacy it enjoys. States support the United States not because they share a common objective, but because they want to benefit politically, economically, and strategically from being associated with Washington. In other words, the United States has allies not because of the objective it tries to achieve but because of what it can offer to them. Such alliances are fickle and last only as long as the benefits allies derive from Washington outweigh the costs. For the United States, managing this situation requires three skills: first, the continued ability to offer benefits to potential allies; second, diplomatic dexterity to manage mostly bilateral alliances; and third, the strategic flexibility required in order to be able to change swiftly from one ally to another. 相似文献
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Laurence Jarvik Author Vitae 《Orbis》2006,50(1):167-186
Three historical forces having shaped Russia—the Land, the Church, and the West. Fifteen years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia remains the largest country on earth, with geopolitical interests in virtually every nation on the Eurasian continent and a fast-growing economy. The Russian Orthodox Church has resumed its place at the center of Russian culture, a culture that must be considered when assessing Russia's prospects for democratization. Likewise, Russians’ understanding of the West and democracy often suffers from misapprehensions that must be overcome in order for it to be attractive to Russia to move toward its own form of democracy. For U.S.-Russian differences today are primarily cultural, not ideological. 相似文献
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David H. Bayley Author Vitae 《Orbis》2006,50(3):469-479
The fundamental objective of the United States in its efforts to reform justice systems abroad has been to develop effective institutions of criminal justice that can support transitions to democratic government. Unfortunately, the United States has not been doing this as well as it might, Iraq being the most dramatic case. These efforts lack coherent Congressional oversight and strategic vision, neglect improving the normative quality of local justice systems and developing the capacity to manage by results, and subordinate local reform to the security needs of foreign countries. To remedy these shortcomings, the United States needs to develop and coordinate justice assistance programs that are context specific, recruit and deploy justice specialists from all sectors and levels of the American justice system, incorporate a developmental perspective in justice assistance programs, and formulate programs that are based on proven “best practices.” 相似文献
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Andrei P. Tsygankov Author Vitae 《Orbis》2006,50(1):153-165
This article evaluates Russia's foreign policy after Vladimir Putin's reelection as president in March 2004. New challenges, such as the intensification of terrorist activities in the Northern Caucasus, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the destabilization of Central Asia, and the refusal by some European states to attend the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of victory over fascism hosted in Moscow became important tests of Putin's strategy of great-power pragmatism. That strategy reflected a desire for Russia to be a normal great power and focused on cooperating with Western nations on a range of economic and security issues. This course had to be defended against criticisms at home in the context of intensified efforts by Western nations, particularly the United States, to influence developments in the former Soviet states. The article concludes by reflecting on some dilemmas that Putin's strategy is likely to encounter in the future. 相似文献
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