Assessing political support in China: Citizens’ evaluations of governmental effectiveness and legitimacy

Whether the Chinese Communist regime can maintain socio‐political stability and survive the potentially turbulent transition to the post‐Deng Xiaoping era remains a serious question challenging many China watchers. Assuming that political support is vital to the stability of any regime, the authors seek to answer this question by examining two major components of political support, instrumental support (citizens’ evaluations of governmental effectiveness) and affective support (citizens’ evaluations of governmental legitimacy). Using data collected from a public opinion survey conducted in Beijing, China in late 1995, this study explores the levels of both affective support and instrumental support, and the nature of the relationship between these two types of political support in China today. The results of this study show that: (1) the current Chinese regime enjoys a moderately high level of affective support and a slightly lower level of instrumental support; (2) the two types of political support are moderately correlated; and (3) the relationship between these two types of support persists across key demographic groups. Based on these results, the authors conclude that the current Chinese leadership has a good chance to maintain political stability in the post‐Deng era, while it will face severe challenges in substantially upgrading its current level of legitimacy by solely relying upon improvements in governmental effectiveness in the short term.     

Pre-emption,Deterrence, and Self-Defence: A Legal and Historical Assessment

The policy of the United States, outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, whereby the US claims a right under international law to engage in pre-emptive use of force to prevent a rogue state's development of nuclear weapons, or any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), is unnecessary and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. This conclusion is reached through a comprehensive and intensive assessment of the normative reactions of politically effective actors to China's development of nuclear weapons during a two-year period between the Cuban Missile Crisis and China's first test in October 1964. While pre-emptive use of force against China, a rogue state, was considered by both the United States and most likely by the Soviet Union, neither used force to prevent it developing nuclear weapons. Since a policy of pre-emptive use of force was unnecessary for either state's self-defence, it would have been unlawful under customary international law. Given that the current strategic scenario of states vis-à-vis rogue states is the same under most circumstances, notwithstanding the existence of international terrorist networks, the article concludes that the proposed claim of the United States is, prima facie, unnecessary to its self-defence, and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. It shifts the burden of proof to policymakers claiming that all rogue states can be lawfully prevented through pre-emptive use of force from acquiring nuclear weapons, to establish that a particular state cannot be deterred from the use of nuclear weapons. Though the preventive war claim of the US National Security Strategy 2002 may turn out to be an effective strategic bluff in limiting WMD proliferation, the wisdom of the threat should not be confused with the illogic of preventive war.     

The U.S.-Indian Nuclear Agreement: Balancing Energy Needs and Nonproliferation Goals

President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India signed a statement of intent in 2005 to allow India access to civilian nuclear technology, despite its not being a signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty. This deal would reverse decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy, since India was the source for much of U.S. law on this count. It would require Congress to amend that law to create special exceptions for India. Rationales and critiques of the proposed deal have focused on its impact on the future exercise of U.S. authority on nonproliferation policy worldwide. But the broader impact may be felt internally, since nonproliferation decisions have been inextricably linked to national security imperatives. In acknowledging an economic justification for allowing India access to nuclear energy, the deal has also created a new dependency between U.S. national security policy and the energy profile of emerging powers.