Cycles of Jihadist Movements and the Role of Irrationality

The article argues that Islamist terror is driven by irrational forces; it analyzes jihadist values and doctrines that animate Islamic revolutionaries; it then contends that jihadist movements go through a cycle of mobilization, extremism, implosion and recreation. Finally, it assesses the prospects for jihadist revitalization, extremism, and decline in Syria and the Sahel. Examples from the Iraqi and Algerian jihadist campaigns are used for illustrative purposes throughout.     

Iranian Involvement in Yemen

For at least a decade, there have been numerous Yemeni, Saudi, and other countries’ assertions that Iran has been involved in supporting northern Yemeni rebels seeking autonomy from the Sana’a government. Iranian diplomatic and political support for this rebellious group (known as the Houthis) is undeniable, but Iranian military assistance for them has not always been easy to prove. This situation appeared to change in 2011 when Iran's increased involvement in Yemen occurred in response to both the chaotic situation there during the final year of the Saleh regime and the danger that the Arab Spring revolutions would leave Iran increasingly isolated. Evidence of Iranian efforts to supply weapons to the Houthis now seems overwhelming in contrast to uncertain reports prior to 2011. In addition, at least some of Yemen's southern secessionists also appear to be receiving at least limited Iranian financial support.     

Knowing the past to understand the present - issues in the contracting for cloud based services

This article builds on our previous introductory article to cloud computing ([2009] 25 CLSR 270-274) and seeks to explain how cloud computing has evolved. We then discuss how this evolution impacts on key contractual and legal considerations and how the treatment of these considerations might differ from their treatment in traditional IT supply agreements.     

The Rise of Gulf War Paradigm 2.0

The adage that “it is always easier to fight the last war” is one that readily can be applied to the United States and its armed forces for not predicting the scale and type of operations encountered in the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. This article argues that the lack of preparation in the post-invasion phases arose from an institutional attachment to a preferred paradigm of warfare, as exemplified by the Persian Gulf War of 1991. This paradigm, though, has been substantially resurrected and re-configured to suit the fighting preferences of the American armed forces in its protracted encounters in Iraq and Afghanistan. Far from re-orienting its organization and mindset to meet the challenges of so-called counterinsurgency campaigns, as much current advocacy maintains, the military has reverted to the form of warfare it knows best.     

‘Fade to Grey’: Older women,embodied claims and attributions in English university departments of education

This article explores the experiences of a small number of older women who work in university departments of education. The article starts with a brief review of some of the research that documents the experiences of women who work in departments of education. The article then considers the ways in which the older woman's body has become a focus for action, suppression and, above all, a site for constant work. Women are exhorted by the mass media to be vigilant in order to combat the embodied signs of passing time and to work on the project of the (ageing) body. The article then explores some of the ways that older women in education departments may be positioned/position themselves in relation to these pressures and some of the ways in which they disrupt these discourses.     

Instructions for Authors

Instructions for Authors

Instructions for Authors     

China, Nuclear Security and Terrorism: Implications for the United States

This article outlines Chinese strategic nuclear forces and the Chinese philosophical approach to nuclear security. It then focuses on the domestic conditions in China which could precipitate vulnerabilities to its nuclear forces. From information about internal security conditions in China, specific internal threats to Chinese nuclear security will be derived. Based on these threats, several outsider and insider scenarios will be outlined involving a variety of terrorist or terrorist related behaviors. These notional scenarios will include everything from overrun or attack, to diversion, to cyber terrorism, to sabotage. The article will then cover what these scenarios and the possible Chinese reaction to them may mean for the security, military and diplomatic strategies of the United States.     

Reassessing U.S. Strategy in the Aftermath of the Korean War

This article examines the reassessment of U.S. strategy that Dwight D. Eisenhower directed after replacing Harry S. Truman in the White House in January 1953, as he worked to bring the Korean War to an end and then confronted the problems remaining in its aftermath. Despite much of the rhetoric of the early Eisenhower administration, the outcome of that reassessment fit more closely the objective of containment than key strategic formulations of its predecessor. Why was this so? How did the orientation apply to ending the war in Korea and sustaining the U.S. position there and elsewhere after the armistice? What insights, if any, do the process of reassessment and its outcome provide for the present? Answers to these questions serve to emphasize the dynamic and contingent nature of American strategy in the early Cold War and the importance of flexible, engaged leadership in the White House.     

Innovation or Inertia: The U.S. Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency

Following its encounter with insurgent violence in Iraq, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has sought to improve the U.S. military's ability to conduct counterinsurgency. This effort suggests a potential turning-point in the history of the U.S. military, which has traditionally devoted its attention and resources to “high-intensity” or “conventional” combat. Given this institutional culture, what are now the prospects of the U.S. military ‘learning counterinsurgency’? In many ways, the ongoing reorientation is promising and targeted, informed directly by the U.S. campaign in Iraq. At the same time, Pentagon priorities still reveal a remarkable resistance to change, and this in spite of the radically altered strategic environment of the War on Terror. Given this intransigence - and the eventual fall-out from the troubled Iraq campaign - the ongoing learning of counterinsurgency might very well fail to produce the type of deep-rooted change needed to truly transform the U.S. military.